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1 Introduction
Identifying the link between taxes and evasion is an equally difficult as important task for empirical
research: it is difficult, because measuring evasion requires us to work with ‘evidence of the invisible’
(Slemrod and Weber, 2012); at the same time, it is important to quantify evasion responses to taxation,
in order to predict revenue consequences of tax reforms and to design optimal tax policies.1 In contrast
to studies that exploit exogenous variation in enforcement (e.g., Kleven et al., 2011), however, causal
evidence on the impact of taxes on evasion is still scarce. The early literature on income tax evasion
provides conflicting evidence (e.g., Clotfelter, 1983; Slemrod, 1985; Feinstein, 1991). Recent studies
point to a positive effect: Gorodnichenko et al. (2009), who study a major tax reform in Russia,
find a huge positive elasticity of evasion with respect to the tax rate.2 Kleven et al. (2011) examine
bunching at kinks in the Danish income tax schedule. Comparing bunching of pre- and post-auditing
incomes, they identify a small positive effect of tax rates on evasion. Our paper indirectly contributes
to this literature by studying the evasion of TV license fees. Based on unique cross-sectional data
from Austria, we examine whether higher fees result in more evasion.
License fees are a widespread tool to finance public broadcasting: two thirds of all European,
half of all African and Asian, and a few countries in the Americas collect license fees. In 2005, a
total of e 20 billion on fees were collected in Europe (see Fellner et al., 2013). Households have an
incentive to evade fees because public broadcasting programs can be received without paying fees.
Rincke and Traxler (2011) demonstrate that households trade off the gains from evasion against the
costs of detection. Beyond this similarity to tax evasion, the institutional framework is attractive as
it offers a good measure of evasion: 99 percent of all Austrian households own a radio or TV (ORF
Medienforschung, 2006), which makes them liable to register for license fees, according to federal law.
Relating the number of registered to all households thus gives a reasonable proxy for evasion. In
addition, the set-up allows us to apply a border based identification strategy in the spirit of Holmes
(1998).
1Note that taxable income is not a sufficient statistic to evaluate the efficiency cost of income taxation when behavioral
responses generate externalities (Saez et al., 2012). As tax evasion is associated with fiscal externalities (Chetty, 2009),
optimal income taxation depends on whether the elasticity of taxable income is mainly driven by evasion rather than,
say, labor supply responses (Piketty et al., 2014).
2Their results might be influenced by a simultaneous reform in the tax administration. Further evidence on large
behavioral responses in a high evasion context are provided by Kopczuk (2012) and, in the context of tariff evasion, by
Fisman and Wei (2004).
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Total license fees include a specific state tax. While the collection and enforcement of the fees
is harmonized at the federal level, variation in the state tax creates significant border differentials
in license fees. We exploit these discontinuities – or ‘border notches’ (Slemrod, 2010) – by compar-
ing evasion rates among municipalities on the high- and low-tax side of state borders. In addition,
we compute the driving distance of each municipality to the nearest state border and implement a
regression discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Before doing so, we carefully discuss the
identifying assumptions that allow us to exploit the border differentials in a quasi-experimental way.
Among others, we document that – within the tightly constrained framework of Austria’s federal-
ism – other fiscal policies are uncorrelated to the specific state tax. Moreover, we show that a large
set of relevant municipality characteristics (including enforcement rates) are balanced and smoothly
distributed around the borders.
The analysis of border differentials identifies a precisely estimated, positive effect of fees on evasion.
This result is confirmed in different parametric and non-parametric approaches and survives several
robustness checks. On average, license fees increase by around 18 percent – from e 206 to e 243 – at
the state borders. This differential is accompanied by a discontinuous increase in the evasion rate of 5
percentage points. Putting these numbers together, our central estimate indicates that a one percent
increase in fees raises the evasion rate by about 0.3 percentage points.
Given that this semi-elasticity reflects a binary response – evasion at the extensive margin – it is
hard to directly compare the effect size with the intensive margin responses analyzed in the literature.
However, finding a large evasion response is consistent with the huge elasticities of evasion with respect
to tax rates documented in the few other studies: Fisman and Wei (2004), for instance, find that a one
percent increase in taxes and tariffs increases import tax evasion by more than 3 percent. Fack and
Landais (2016) document that the elasticity of overreporting tax deductions (charitable contributions)
is large and above 2. Similarly strong income reporting effects in equally weak enforcement contexts
are provided by Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) and Kopczuk (2012). The large effect identified in our
institutional set-up seems consistent with these findings.
We make several contributions to the literature. First and foremost, our evidence strongly supports
the intuition that higher taxes trigger more evasion. This is important for two reasons. On the one
hand, the relationship between taxes and evasion is theoretically ambiguous (Yitzhaki, 1974). We
introduce a simple model to study the binary evasion decision which is relevant in our case. Although
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our set-up differs from the classical income tax evasion theory in several important ways, we show
that the ambiguous comparative static from the literature also applies to our context. On the other
hand, empirical evidence on the causal link between taxation and evasion is scarce and conflicting (see
the survey in Andreoni et al., 1998). In light of this scarcity and in the absence of a clear theoretical
prediction, the result that higher fees trigger more evasion marks a valuable contribution. Moreover,
by studying a binary evasion decision, we provide a rare piece of evidence on the extensive margin of
evasion.
On a more general account, our study provides evidence that further corroborates the rational
model of evasion which stresses the economic incentives to cheat. The relevance of these incentives was
often questioned in the past. Over the last years, however, several studies convincingly demonstrated
that the expected costs from evasion play a significant role in shaping non-compliance (Kleven et al.,
2011; Fellner et al., 2013; Dwenger et al., 2016). The present paper contributes to this literature by
documenting the impact of the potential gains from cheating.
In terms of methods, the present study is the first to use discontinuities at borders – in the
tradition of Holmes (1998) and Black (1999) – to identify the effect of taxes on evasion. Our approach
is closely related to recent work that exploits state tax differentials to analyze cigarette tax avoidance
(Merriman, 2010) and the role of the internet as a tax haven (Agrawal, 2014).3 More generally, we
contribute to the growing literature on border based identification (e.g., Bayer et al., 2007) and spatial
regression discontinuity designs (e.g., Lalive, 2008).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional back-
ground and describes our data. In Section 3 we discuss a simple theoretical model with a binary
evasion decision. Section 4 briefly discusses the outcome from a naive cross-sectional regression and
highlights the identification problem. Section 5 discusses our identification strategy and presents the
results from a border notch and a spatial RD design. The last section concludes.
3For other studies that work with border tax differentials, see Eugster and Parchet (2013), Agrawal (2015), and
Agrawal and Hoyt (2014).
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2 Set-up and Data
2.1 TV License Fees
Many countries in the world use obligatory TV and radio license fees to finance public broadcasting.
A typical system of license fees can be found in Austria, where the Broadcasting License Fee Act
stipulates that every ‘household’ (broadly defined, including apartment-sharing communities, etc.)
must register its broadcasting equipment with Fee Info Service (FIS). FIS, a subsidiary of the public
broadcasting company, is responsible for collecting and enforcing the fees. Each year, one license fee
has to be paid per household, independently of the number of household members, TVs and radios.4
In 2005, the relevant year for our study, the annual public broadcasting contribution was e 182. In
addition to this contribution, the total fee due included federal taxes (e 24) plus a state tax. This state
tax (‘Landesabgabe’) considerably differed between the states. As a consequence, the total annual fees
ranged from e 206 to e 263.5 On average, 25% of the total fee represent state or federal taxes (see
below). The license fee system thus includes a non-trivial tax component.
Public broadcasting programs can be received without paying license fees. Households therefore
face an incentive to evade license fees (and thereby the included taxes) by not registering their broad-
casting equipment. FIS takes several actions to enforce compliance. It sends mailings to unregistered
households (see Fellner et al., 2013) and runs an enforcement division whose members inspect po-
tential evaders at their homes (see Rincke and Traxler, 2011). Detected evaders have to pay evaded
fees and authorities may impose a fine of up to e 2,180. The deterrent threat from these fines and
FIS’ enforcement activities is reflected in a fairly high level of compliance: In 2005, 7.9 percent of
all Austrian households were not registered with FIS, whereas only one percent of households neither
owned a radio nor a TV (ORF Medienforschung, 2006). In total, FIS collected revenues of about e 650
million (roughly 0.3% of GDP). About 10% of this sum were federal taxes and provided revenues for
the national budget (non-earmarked); roughly 15% were based on state taxes and got assigned to the
different states (earmarked for the promotion of art and culture); only the remaining 75% serve the
4An additional fee is due for secondary residences and holiday homes with broadcasting equipment. The fee does
not depend on whether one actually uses the broadcasting equipment. For further institutional details see Fellner et al.
(2013).
5Several states apply the same (round number) tax rates on the broadcasting contribution basis to determine the
Landesabgabe: in 2005 the state tax was e 17.6 in Burgenland and Tirol, e 36.7 in Vienna, e 37.2 in Lower Austria and
Salzburg, e 49.2 in Carinthia, and e 56.5 in Styria. Upper Austria and Vorarlberg did not impose this tax. Possible
explanations for this variation are discussed below (see Section 5).
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public broadcasting system. Compliance is in permanent flux. An easy opportunity to start evading
fees emerges in case of moving. Broadcasting registrations are attached to the place of residence and
moving households often de-register at the old place without registering at the new residence. In
principle, this could be due to forgetfulness. However, households constantly receive nudges which
remind them about their legal obligation to register. During the second half of 2005, FIS placed an
average of three daily spots in countrywide broadcasted channels. In addition there are campaigns in
newspapers and billboards. Not registering after the first few months at a new home thus seems like
a very deliberate choice.
2.2 Data
Our analysis exploits data on the number of households that had registered any broadcasting equip-
ment in the fourth quarter of 2005. The raw data provide this number for each of the 2,380 Austrian
municipalities. Following FIS’ method to compute a proxy for the evasion rate, we compare the num-
ber of households with registered broadcasting equipment, Ri, to the number of households with a
residence in that municipality, Hi. We then compute the evasion rate
Evasioni =
Hi −Ri
Hi
for each municipality i. Since only one percent of households do not own any broadcasting equipment
(see above), Evasioni is a reasonable proxy for a municipality’s evasion rate. Nevertheless, evasion is
measured with error. First, Hi refers to primary places of residence whereas Ri also includes some
registrations of broadcasting equipment at secondary residences (see fn. 4).6 Registrations of the
latter type are very infrequent and only account for 1.3 percent of all broadcasting registrations. For
municipalities with a significant share of secondary residences, we could nonetheless observe Ri > Hi.
In response to this point, we deviated from the FIS’ standard and used the sum of primary and
secondary residences as basis for computing an alternative evasion rate. All results reported below are
robust to using this alternative measure. However, to avoid problems related to the underreporting
of secondary residences in the official residency register we focus on the evasion rate as defined above.
6Note further that Ri also includes registrations that emerged from past enforcement activities.
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Second, there are no municipality level data that would allow us to correct for variation in the
number of households without broadcasting equipment. This measurement error could become prob-
lematic if it were correlated with the level of the fees. To asses this concern we studied TV ownership
using data from a large, representative survey (see Online Appendix). The analysis shows that the
correlation between TV license fees and ownership is statistically and economically insignificant: a
one percent increase in the fee is associated with less than a 0.01 percentage point lower chance of
owning a TV (see Table III.1 in the Online Appendix). We are therefore confident that the variable
captures evasion rather than real economic responses.
Table 1 about here.
Table 1 shows that the average evasion rate across all 2,380 Austrian municipalities is 4.5 percent. If
we weight each municipality’s evasion rate by the number of households, we obtain a weighted average
of 7.9 percent (which corresponds to the total evasion rate in Austria, i.e.,
∑
i(Hi − Ri)/
∑
iHi).
FIS also provided us with data on license fees and on the number of registrations stemming from
the enforcement division’s door-to-door checks. Based on the latter, we compute municipality level
enforcement rates as the sum of enforced registrations during 2005 relative to Hi. As displayed in
Table 1, the average enforcement rate was 1.2 percent.
We complement the data from FIS with an extensive set of municipality characteristics.7 Our
data include, among others, information on labor income, age, education, occupational structure,
household size, religion and voting outcomes. The descriptive statistics indicate that municipalities
are fairly small, with an average of 1,500 households. As discussed in more detail in Section 5.2, we
also computed the driving distance from each municipality to the nearest state border. On average, a
municipality is located a 41 minute drive from the closest state border.
3 Model
To set the stage for our empirical analysis, we first study the role of fees for a household’s decision to
either pay or evade fees. We model this binary choice in the spirit of Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
An agent with an exogenous (after-tax) income yi faces a license fee t. If he pays the fee, his available
income is yi− t. If he evades the fee, he is detected with probability p, 0 < p < 1. In case of detection,
7Detailed information on data sources and further summary statistics are provided in the Online Appendix.
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he has to pay the license fee and a fine, s > 0, resulting in an available income of yi − t − s. In case
the evasion remains undetected, the agent avoids any payment.
Preferences over available income are described by a twice differentiable function Ui(.), with U
′
i >
0 ≥ U ′′i . Utility is given by the deterministic Ui(.) plus a random utility component η for the case of
compliance.8 The agent will choose to evade if and only if
pUi(yi − t− s) + (1− p)Ui(yi) ≥ Ui(yi − t) + η. (1)
Let η be distributed according to the cdf F (.). The probability of evasion is then given by
F (x) with x := pUi(yi − t− s) + (1− p)Ui(yi)− Ui(yi − t). (2)
Note that this model deviates from the classical theory of income tax evasion in two important
ways: First, the fee t is not a rate but a fixed payment. Second, the fine s is neither proportional
to the evaded fee (Yitzhaki, 1974) nor to the income. The comparative statics for our set-up are
therefore not at all obvious. Based on (2) one can analyze how the probability of evasion responds to
an increase in t. Differentiating F (x) w.r.t. t we obtain
F ′(x)
∂x
∂t
= F ′(x)
[
U ′i(yi − t)− pU ′i(yi − t− s)
]
. (3)
For a risk-neutral agent (U ′′i = 0), U
′
i is constant and ∂x/∂t > 0 since p < 1. The probability that a
risk-neutral agent evades is therefore increasing in the fee (for F ′(x) > 0). For the case of risk-aversion
(U ′′i < 0), the sign of ∂x/∂t is ambiguous. As long as the degree of risk aversion (captured by the
curvature of the utility function) is sufficiently small or, equivalently, if p is sufficiently small, one
obtains ∂x/∂t > 0. Hence, for p < p := U ′i(yi − t)/U ′i(yi − t − s) (where U ′′i < 0 implies 0 < p < 1),
the probability of evasion is again increasing in the fee. Although the enforcement rate is quite low in
8One might think of η as the ‘net’ effect from different random utility terms that separately enter the (expected)
utility from evasion (say η−) and from compliance (η+). These terms might, for instance, reflect heterogenous levels of
intrinsic motivation to comply.
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our context (see Table 1), it is hard to judge whether the condition from above is met. The empirical
analysis will shed further light on this point.9
4 Cross-sectional Analysis
As a starting point, we analyze the cross-sectional variation in evasion. We estimate the model
Evasioni = α
cs + βcs log(Feesi) + Xiγ
cs + csi , (4)
where Xi includes a large set of control variables that account for municipality differences in, e.g.,
population size and density, age, educational, religious, household and occupational structure as well
as voting outcomes. In addition, we control for the local enforcement rate and average labor income.
As license fees only vary at the state level, we compute clustered standard errors. To account for the
small number of cluster units (Austria has nine states), we bootstrap the standard errors following
Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure.
The results from OLS estimates of equation (4) are reported in Table 2.10 We find a positive
correlation between the level of license fees and the evasion rates. The coefficient indicates that a
one percent increase in fees is correlated with a 0.13 percentage point increase in the evasion rate.
The estimate, however, is statistically insignificant as the (bootstrapped) clustered standard errors
are fairly large.
Table 2 about here.
9Two further comparative statics are worth noting. First, it is straightforward to demonstrate that the
probability of evasion is decreasing with a higher detection risk, p, and increasing in risk aversion. Sec-
ond, the effect of income on evasion is less clear-cut. Taking the derivative of F (x) w.r.t. yi we arrive at
F ′(x) ∂x
∂yi
= F ′(x) [pU ′i(yi − t− s) + (1− p)U ′i(yi)− U ′i(yi − t)]. For risk-neutrality we get ∂x/∂yi = 0 and there
would be no income effect on evasion. For the case of risk-aversion, ∂x/∂yi is positive whenever p > p :=
[U ′i(yi − t)− U ′i(yi)] / [U ′i(yi − t− s)− U ′i(yi)]. If this condition is satisfied, the probability of evasion increases in in-
come. It is worth noting that the latter condition, p > p, does not conflict with p < p from above. One can easily show
that 0 < p < p < 1. (To do so, rewrite p < p as U ′i(yi − t− s) [U ′i(yi − t)− U ′i(yi)] < U ′i(yi − t) [U ′i(yi − t− s)− U ′i(yi)].
Simplifying yields U ′i(yi − t − s) > U ′i(yi − t), which holds due to U ′′i < 0.) Hence, for the case p < p < p, the model
would predict that the evasion probability increases in the fee and in income.
10The complete estimation output for all control variables is reported in the Online Appendix.
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The cross-sectional analysis further shows a negative correlation between the enforcement and the
evasion rate11 as well as an economically and statistically insignificant income effect. At the same time
there is a strong, positive correlation between the share of self-employed and the evasion rate. Previous
research has found that receiving self-employed (i.e., not third-party reported) income crucially shapes
the opportunity to evade income taxes (Kleven et al., 2011). In our case, there is no ‘technological’
difference in the opportunity to evade license fees between different occupational groups. A possible
interpretation of the evidence is that more self-employment within a municipality is correlated with
less risk aversion (Ekelund et al., 2005). In turn, this might produce more evasion.
Given the lack of experimental variation in license fees, it is questionable whether the positive
correlation between license fees and evasion captures a causal effect. The state level taxes that drive
the differences in the fees might be set according to unobserved factors (e.g., risk-attitudes) that shape
evasion. To the extent that our control variables do not (fully) account for these factors, the OLS
estimate for βcs might be downward biased.12 In the following, we discuss two approaches to this
identification problem.
5 Identification and Results
5.1 Border Notches
Our first approach to identify the effect of fees on evasion relates to the notion of ‘border notches’
(Slemrod, 2010), i.e., the idea that borders create discontinuous changes in a certain treatment. In
our context, there are border tax differentials (similar as, e.g., in Agrawal, 2015) which produce
discontinuous changes in license fees at state borders (see Section 2). The comparison of evasion rates
between municipalities on the ‘high tax’- and ‘low tax’-side of a state border then captures the effect
of interest, as long as other factors that shape evasion do not change discontinuously at the border.
Several institutional aspects suggest that our application gets quite close to this ideal design.
11Due to the obvious simultaneity between evasion and enforcement, the coefficient is potentially misleading. Iden-
tifying the causal effect of enforcement on evasion is beyond the scope of the present paper (see Rincke and Traxler,
2011). If we run instrumental variable estimations that follow a similar identification strategy as Rincke and Traxler,
2SLS estimates indicate a substantially larger deterrent effect from enforcement. The estimated β, however, remains
unaffected.
12Consider a hypothetical variable that measures local risk aversion, vi which would enter with coefficient γv < 0 in
equation (4). As long as fees are higher in states with more risk averse taxpayers, Cov (log(Feesi), vi) > 0, omitting vi
implies that the OLS estimate for βcs is biased downwards.
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First, the public broadcasting service and its quality attributes do not depend on the variation
of the fee. The revenues from the (federal and state) taxes, which FIS collects together with the
broadcasting contributions, are not invested into broadcasting. Public broadcasting service is almost
identical across all of Austria. The state specific content in TV programs, for instance, accounts for
only four out of 336 weekly hours of public broadcasting.
Second, Austrian fiscal rules provide little incentives for households to sort on the low-fee side
of a state border. For one, the border tax differentials per se are too small to plausibly influence
a household’s residential choice.13 In addition, other local fiscal parameters that may be correlated
with the level of the state tax are likely to play a limited role, too. In Austria, essentially all im-
portant fiscal and welfare policies are set at the level of the central government. In principle, states
do have spending responsibilities in several domains (e.g., health care, primary and secondary edu-
cation). However, the states (and municipalities) have hardly any taxing power and rely largely on
inter-governmental grants and shared federal tax revenues for which the central government has full
legislative responsibilities (OECD, 2005).14 Moreover, there exists a Fiscal Equalization Law, which
regulates inter-governmental fiscal relations and explicitly aims at achieving equal living conditions
in all regions. As a consequence, a substantial share of the grants to the states is earmarked and the
central government heavily constraints the framework under which sub-central governments can ma-
neuver (Fuentes et al., 2006). Consistent with the objective of the Fiscal Equalization Law, mobility
rates in Austria are quite low.
Third, a serious threat to identification could arise if enforcement activities endogenously respond
to the tax differentials: if higher fees trigger more evasion this could in turn stipulate more enforcement
on the high-fee side of a border. Institutional arrangements should again prevent this from happening,
as the allocation of enforcement resources is centralized and based on the overall population size rather
13Note that the state taxes which induce the variation in the license fees changed over time. Prior to 2005, reforms
were rare and maintained the ‘high- vs. low-fee’ ranking between neighboring states, but more recent reforms reverted
some of these rankings. If households rationally anticipated the possibility of such reforms they should not put much
emphasis on the current level of license fees in their location choice. If there still was sorting according to fees, one might
argue that any endogenous mobility responses would bias the estimated βb downwards. Recall from above that moving
offers an opportunity to start evading. When households systematically move into ‘low-fee’ municipalities at a border,
the higher population influx should ceteris paribus increase the evasion rate – despite lower license fees. Hence, we would
obtain a lower bound on the effect of fees on evasion.
14In 2005, the central government collected 95.15% of general tax revenue; the respective shares for states and mu-
nicipalities were only 1.58% and 3.26%, respectively. In the same year, central government expenditure of total general
government expenditure was 69.23%, as compared to 16.93% and 13.84% for the states and municipalities (see OECD
Fiscal Decentralization Database).
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than the level of evasion.15 In addition, the second important parameter of enforcement, the fine s,
is harmonized between states. Note further that, beyond enforcement, the procedure to voluntarily
register for license fees is the same in all states. Hence, there is now border differential in compliance
costs.
Finally, concerning the specific location of the borders, one might question whether municipality
characteristics change at a border for topographical reasons. This concern is based on the fact that
several Austrian state borders – especially those separating the ‘northern’ from the ‘southern’ states
– are defined along Alpine mountain chains. It seems plausible that such natural borderlines could be
associated with differences between bordering municipalities.16
Balancing Tests. Motivated by the discussion from above, we first study correlations between the
specific state tax (‘Landesabgabe’, which drives the variation in licence fees) and different state level
expenditures and revenues. Even though the state tax is earmarked for promoting art and culture, we
do not find any significant correlation with the states’ cultural expenditures (r = −0.357, p = 0.385).
We obtain similar results – with either insignificantly positive or negative correlations – for other
expenditure categories (e.g., health and education) as well as for overall expenditures and revenues.
However, we do observe that states with higher debts impose a higher state tax: More indebted states
seem to more actively exploit the rare chance to set a decentralized tax, even if this does not translate
into higher overall revenues. Since the debt at the state level is relatively small (state debts accounted
for 7% of total public debt in 2013) and states have only limited fiscal autonomy (see fn. 12), we do
not expect the level of state debt to directly affect license fee evasion. The variation in state debts is
therefore unlikely to threaten identification.
In a second step, we examine whether enforcement rates, household mobility and other municipality
characteristics are balanced between the two sides of each state border. To do so, we run linear
regressions of the form
xi = µ+ ρDi + νi (5)
15FIS’ headquarter in Vienna assigns – depending on a county’s population – one or two enforcement officers to each
county. Working under a piece-rate contract, these local officers then choose independently when and where to monitor
households in one of the county’s municipalities (see Rincke and Traxler, 2011).
16It is worth noting that basically none of the state borders overlaps with important historical borderlines. In fact,
the precise line of Austria’s state borders are fairly young in historical terms: the borders result from transforming the
law from Habsburg Monarchy, together with the provisions of the State Treaty of St. Germain (1919) and the Venice
Protocol (1921), into Austrian constitutional law past WWI. Between 1938-45, the states of Tyrol and Vorarlberg were
unified, and Burgenland was separated into two formerly non-existing states. Past WWII, the state borders of 1937 were
reestablished.
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for the sample of border municipalities; xi denotes the variable that is compared and Di is a dummy
indicating whether a border municipality is located on the high-fee side of a state border. The
coefficient of interest, ρ, reflects differences between the two sides of the border. Using 41 different
municipality characteristics as dependent variables we separately estimate equation (5) for each of
the 12 Austrian state borders listed in Table 3.17 The estimated ρ’s for several key municipality
characteristics are reported in Table A.1. (Results for all 12 × 41 regressions are discussed in the
Online Appendix.)
Consistent with the centralized allocation of enforcement resources, we do not find any systematic
differences in enforcement rates.18 In 10 out of 12 borders, there are no significant differences in
enforcement activities across borders. In one case, the enforcement rate is slightly lower on the high-
fee side of the border, in one case it is higher. The balancing tests also fail to detect evidence on
systematic household sorting according to fees. The evidence is consistent with our conjecture that
the fairly small differences in license fees do not influence residential choices. Beyond these primary
characteristics of interest, the balancing tests do reveal several significant differences. However, for
none of these variables we detect any systematic heterogeneity that is correlated with the level of license
fees. Moreover, and in line with the discussion from above, the observed differences are primarily
concentrated at state borders that are defined along the Alps.
Figure 1 about here.
Table 3 about here.
To account for the unbalanced municipality characteristics, our analysis will focus on the most
balanced borders. We define a primary sample that excludes all borders which display significant
differences (with p ≤ 0.05) in more than 2 out of the 41 variables. With this cutoff, the main sample
is composed of the four most balanced borders, indicated in Figure 1 and Table 3. The first two of
these borders – Upper/Lower Austria and Upper Austria/Salzburg – are predominantly flat and non-
mountainous. The two other borders – Salzburg/Styria and Vorarlberg/Tyrol – are more mountainous
17Our analysis does not include the border between Vienna’s outer districts and Lower Austria, as Vienna’s jurisdictions
differ systematically (and substantially) from the much smaller, neighboring municipalities. This reflects Vienna’s special
status as capital city and state.
18Below we will show that there are more evaders on the high-fee side of a border. Together with the constant
enforcement rate this seems to suggest that the detection rate among evaders is actually lower on the high fee-side.
However, this conclusion would be drawn too quickly as it mixes flow (detections during the last year) and stock
variables (evaders at a given point in time). If we empirically compute a proxy for the average rate of detections among
the population at risk during the last year, we find again no significant differences at the borders.
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but expand from North to South and are thus orthogonal to the East-West stretch of the Alps.19 Given
that the choice of the cutoff is somewhat arbitrary, one might question the composition of the primary
estimation sample. In what follows below, we address this concern by replicating each step of analysis
for the full sample that includes all state borders.
Graphical Evidence. A first illustration of the change in the evasion rate at the borders is provided
in Figure 2. The figure displays the evasion rates among border municipalities at the four borders
from the main sample (see Table 3). At the first border (Upper/Lower Austria), annual license fees
increase from e 206.16 to e 243.36. Evasion rates also increase from 1.4 to 4.2 percent, with the
difference being significant (p = 0.055, according to a two-sided t-test). For the second border (Upper
Austria/Salzburg), which is characterized by the same differential in license fees, we again observe a
significant increase in evasion rates (from 4.0 to 10.1 percent; p = 0.001) when we move from the low
to the high-fee side of the border. At the third border (Salzburg/Styria), fees jump from e 243.36
to e 262.56 and evasion increases from 5.2 to 8.8 percent (p = 0.588, due to a larger variance and
a smaller sample). At the fourth border (Vorarlberg/Tyrol), the increase in fees from e 206.16 to
e 233.76 is accompanied by a major increase in evasion from 2.0 to 21.1 percent (p = 0.094).20 Hence,
the observed differences in evasion rates are all positive and statistically significant at three out of four
borders. While the analysis also illustrates a fairly large variation in evasion rates between different
borders, one has to keep in mind that the samples at the last two borders are fairly small. Overall,
the figure provides a first piece of evidence suggesting that higher fees trigger more evasion.
Figure 2 about here
Parametric Results. In a second step, we estimate the model
Evasioni = α
b + βb log(Feesi) + Xiγ
b + Biφ
b + bi (6)
for all municipalities i that are located directly at a state border. Bi is a vector of border fixed effects
which account for common differences in evasion rates between municipalities from different borders
(see Figure 2). We augment this model by replacing the border with border-municipality group fixed
19All our results are robust when we exclude the two latter borders from the main sample.
20The corresponding p-values for one-sided t-tests of the hypothesis that evasion is higher among municipalities on
the high-fee side of the border are p = 0.027, p = 0.000, p = 0.294, and p = 0.047, respectively.
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effects. The latter fixed effects (which are similar to the boundary dummies used in, e.g., Black, 1999;
Bayer et al., 2007) absorb any unobserved heterogeneity across groups of municipalities along each
border.21 The augmented model thus estimates βb only from the variation in fees within the different
border-municipality groups.
The outcome from estimating equation (6) for the sample of municipalities located at the state
borders from the main sample is provided in columns (1)–(3) of Table 4. For the first specification, the
estimated coefficient is 0.33 and highly significant. The result hardly changes when we omit border
fixed effects. In column (2), we include the full set of border-municipality group fixed effects (41
dummies). The estimate slightly increases to 0.36 and remains highly significant. When we add the
full vector of controls from the cross-sectional regression, the coefficient and standard error in column
(3) remain again fairly stable. The last estimate suggests that a one percent increase in fees results
in a 0.29 percentage point increase in the evasion rate. Hence, the effect is sizable and almost three
times the correlation observed in the cross-sectional analysis.
Table 4 about here
To assess whether these findings are sensitive to the specific definition of the sample, we re-run the
specifications for the full sample, i.e., for the border municipalities from all state borders (see Table 3).
The estimates, reported in columns (4)–(6) of Table 4 again indicate a significant and stable positive
effect of fees on evasion. The point estimates are quite precisely estimated at 0.28, only slightly below
the coefficients obtained for the main sample.
5.2 Spatial Regression Discontinuity
While the analysis of border tax differentials provides clear evidence on a positive effect of fees on
evasion, it is limited to a fairly small sample of municipalities located right at the state borders. A
natural extension leads to a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD), in which we will make use
of a broader set of municipalities and a different metric to measure distance. The basic idea behind
the spatial RDD is to interpret the distance to the closest state border as an assignment variable that
21This approach can be motivated by the observation that tangential municipalities from different sides of a state
border are indeed very similar in terms of observable characteristics (see above). In contrast to this similarity within a
group of tangential border municipalities, there are often pronounced observable differences between municipality groups.
To account for this heterogeneity along a state border, we assign all municipalities that ‘touch’ each other at one side of
the state border into different groups. The procedure is described in more detail in the Online Appendix.
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decides about the high vs. the low-fee ‘treatment’ (Imbens and Zajonc, 2011). Controlling for distance,
one can then exploit the discontinuous change in fees at the borders. In implementing this design,
we follow the recent literature and compute the driving time to the nearest state border (e.g., Lalive,
2008; Agrawal, 2015).22 This measure of distance is preferable to the simple Euclidian distances, as
driving time better reflects the topography at state borders (in particular, mountains and rivers).
The assumptions for the regression discontinuity to identify the effect of license fees on evasion
are similar to those discussed in Section 5.1. First, given that treatment assignment in a spatial
RDD is non-random (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010), households must not sort conditional on license
fees. Second, beyond license fees, no other relevant variable changes discontinuously at the border.
The discussion as well as the evidence reported above suggest that these assumptions should be
met. To further assess the validity of the identifying assumptions, we provide graphical evidence
and run parametric and non-parametric placebo estimations that explore possible discontinuities in
municipality characteristics (see the Online Appendix). The results from this analysis suggest that
we are not far from an ideal situation with smoothly distributed municipality characteristics around
the borders, in particular, the borders from main estimation sample. For both, the main and the
full sample, we do not detect any discontinuities in, e.g., the enforcement rate or any other variables
that turned out to be correlated with the evasion rate in the cross-sectional analysis (see Figure A.1,
Table A.2 and the Online Appendix). Moreover, and in line with the results from above, we do not
find evidence on systematic sorting into treatment. We are therefore confident that the identifying
assumptions are fulfilled.
Graphical Evidence. Figure 3 illustrates the average differential in license fees at the borders of
our main sample. Municipalities with a negative [positive] distance to the border are located on the
low [high] fee side of the respective state borders. The dots in the figure indicate the average level
of license fees in bins of 5 minutes driving distance.23 The figure shows that, on average, license fees
increase by roughly e 37 at the borders. Relative to the level at the low-fee side of the border this
approximately corresponds to a 18 percent increase. The key question is now whether this differential
is accompanied by a discontinuous increase in evasion rates.
Figures 3 and 4 about here.
22More specifically, we either compute the shortest driving time from each municipality to the closest point at one of
the four state borders from the main sample or one of the 12 state borders from the full sample.
23The 5 minutes bin size is supported by the F-test procedure proposed by Lee and Lemieux (2010, p.309).
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Figure 4, which depicts the discontinuity in evasion, suggests that the answer to the question
is yes. In line with the border differential in license fees, there is a significant jump in the evasion
rate right at the border.24 The fitted line from local linear regressions (with a bandwidth chosen
according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012) suggests that, on average, the evasion rate increases
by 5.2 percentage points at the state borders. Relative to the 18 percent border differential in license
fees (see Figure 3 above), the observed discontinuity translates into a semi-elasticity of 0.29 – which
is identical to the central estimate from the border notch analysis.
In addition to the discontinuity, the figure also reveals that there is quite some variation in the
evasion rate between the municipalities on either side of the borders. Part of this variation can be
explained by observable municipality characteristics (see Section 4). Other factors (e.g., heterogeneity
in the intrinsic motivation to comply) remain unexplained and will be absorbed by the distance
functions introduced below.
RDD Estimates. To estimate the effect of fees on evasion, we run the following two equations:
log(Feesi) = α
f + δfDi + g
f
H(disti)Di + g
f
L(disti)(1−Di) + Biφf + fi (7)
and
Evasioni = α
e + δeDi + g
e
H(disti)Di + g
e
L(disti)(1−Di) + Biφe + ei , (8)
where the dummy Di indicates if a municipality is on the high-fee side of a border, Bi captures border
fixed effects, and ge. (disti), g
f
. (disti) are functions of disti, the driving distance to the nearest border.
These functions, which are allowed to differ between the low- and the high-fee side of the border, take
up any unobserved factors that vary with distance and potentially influence evasion (or the fees). We
use local linear regressions to non-parametrically estimate these equations.25
Equations (7) and (8) deliver the average discontinuity in the fees, δf , and the average discontinuity
in evasion rates, δe, at the border. In the spirit of an instrumental variable approach, δf captures the
‘first-stage’ variation induced by the border discontinuity and δe gives the ‘reduced form’ effect of the
‘treatment’, i.e., the effect from moving from the low- to the high-fee side of a border on the average
24Note that the consistency between Figures 2 and 4 is not at all trivial. The former figure is based on the spatial
location at the border, the RDD graph is based on distance in terms of driving time to the border.
25The Online Appendix presents results from regressions that parametrically estimate polynomial functions for ge. (.)
and gf. (.).
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evasion rate. By comparing the first-stage and the reduced form effect, we obtain the Wald estimator
for the local average effect of license fees on evasion (Hahn et al., 2001):
βRD = δe/δf . (9)
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5 report estimates for δf , δe and βRD for the main sample. We set the
bandwidth following the procedures proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico et al.
(2014), respectively. The results for the two bandwidths (51 and 27 minutes) corroborate the findings
from Section 5.1. The estimates indicate a discontinuity in evasion rates of 4.4 and 5.4 percentage
points, respectively. Together with the estimated jumps in the fee, we obtain highly significant Wald
estimates of 0.28 and 0.34, respectively.26 Hence, a one percent increase in the fee results in an
approximately 0.3 percentage point increase in the evasion rate. These semi-elasticities are again
remarkably close to those obtained from the border notch analysis (compare columns 1–3 in Table 4).
Table 5 about here.
It is worth noting that these estimates are very stable for a broad range of bandwidths. This point is
illustrated in Figure 5, which plots the Wald estimates and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals
for bandwidths ranging from 20 to 80 minutes around the state borders. The dashed, horizontal line
indicates the estimate from column (1) in Table 5, which is based on a bandwidth of 51 minutes.
When we increase the bandwidth, the precision of the estimates increases slightly. Moreover, we
obtain almost identical point estimates for all bandwidths between 30 and 80 minutes driving distance
around the border. In a further sensitivity test, we also considered parametric RDD estimations (see
the Online Appendix). The parametric analysis yields Wald estimates in the range of 0.25 to 0.33,
which again confirms our results from above.
Figure 5 about here.
Finally, we examine whether our results are specific to the main sample or whether the effect
generalizes to all state borders. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 present the results from local linear
regressions with bandwidths of 36 and 33 minutes, respectively (again chosen according to Imbens and
26We also implemented Calonico et al. (2014)’s procedure for bias correction and robust inference. The estimates
hardly change quantitatively and remain highly significant.
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Kalyanaraman, 2012; Calonico et al., 2014). The estimates confirm a highly significant discontinuity in
evasion rates at the state borders. As compared to the main sample, however, the Wald estimates are
much larger. The estimates reach 0.62 and are somewhat less precisely estimated than those reported
in columns (1) and (2). The larger variance in the full sample is also documented in parametric RDD
estimations, which yield semi-elasticities between 0.38 and 0.73 (see the Online Appendix). Moreover,
a bandwidth sensitivity analysis similar to the one presented in Figure 5 suggests that the large point
estimates from columns (3) and (4) considerably shrink for slightly higher bandwidths.
Summing up, the results from the spatial RDD confirm the main finding from the border notch
analysis: higher fees trigger more evasion. For the main sample, the point estimates from the different
designs and specifications are all very close to a semi-elasticity of 0.3. For the full sample, the spatial
RDD delivers the same qualitative result, but a larger and less precisely estimated effect size. Given
the similarity in the results for the main and the full sample noted in Section 5.1, this gap might
appear surprising. It is important to recall, however, that one cannot directly compare the RDD and
the border notch analysis. In the latter, the location at the border is defined in geographic terms. The
spatial RDD uses driving time to the nearest border. For the state borders defined along the Alps –
which are excluded in the main but included in the full sample – these two measures differ quite a bit
and seem to drive the difference in the results.
Placebo Borders. The spatial RDD provides consistent evidence on a positive effect of fees on eva-
sion. One might nevertheless wonder whether it is by chance that we observe a discontinuity in evasion
rates at state borders. To address this concern, we present a placebo test that studies discontinuities
at virtual, randomly generated borders. To do so, we first consider virtual borders that resemble
those from our main sample. As illustrated in Figure 1, these state borders run predominantly from
the north to the south. In a simple approach to mimic this north-south stretch, we introduce ran-
dom borders along longitudinal lines. In particular, we randomly draw three longitudes (in the range
[10.5◦, 11.5◦E], [13.5◦, 14.5◦E], and [15◦, 16◦E]) that split the states from our main sample roughly in
the middle. Municipalities are then assigned to ‘random states’ depending on wether their midpoints
are to the east or the west of these longitudes. In addition, we randomly assign the high-fee dummy
Di to the resulting states. We then iterate this process, compute the distance of each municipality to
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the closest of the randomly drawn borders, and estimate (analogously to equation (8)) whether there
is any discontinuity δe in evasion at these virtual borders.27
As it is computationally very time consuming to repeatedly derive our main distance variable (i.e.,
the minimum driving distance), we focus on simple Euclidean distances from each municipality to the
closest border. This raises the question whether our results are robust to using distance as the crow
flies rather than the driving distance. To answer this question, we replicated the spatial RDD analysis
using the alternative distance measure. The results demonstrate that our results are robust to using
the Euclidean distance (see the Online Appendix, Table III.5).
The distribution of the results from 1000 iterations of estimating border discontinuities in evasion,
δe, for the randomly generated borders are presented in Figure 6. It illustrates the c.d.f. for estimates
from local linear regressions (for a bandwidth which is determined, separately for each random border
draw, according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012). The figure shows that all estimates for the
virtual borders are below the evasion discontinuities from the ‘true’ borders (indicated by the dashed
red line). In fact, the average placebo estimate exactly coincides with zero. Hence, the results strongly
reject the idea that we observe discontinuities in evasion at the true borders by chance.
Figure 6 about here.
To assess whether the outcome from this placebo exercise is sensitive to the details of the im-
plementation, we tested a broad set of alternative approaches. We considered both parametric and
non-parametric estimates, varied the specification and estimation samples, used more than three bor-
ders (drawn from different ranges of longitudes), latitudinal borders, as well as a mixture of latitudinal
and longitudinal borders. For all these approaches we obtain distributions that are similar to the one
presented in Figure 6.
6 Conclusions
Based on unique cross-sectional data that offer a proxy for the evasion of TV license fees in all
2,380 Austrian municipalities, we study the effect of higher fees on evasion. While the collection and
enforcement of license fees is harmonized at the federal level, the total fee due includes federal and
27In principle, one could also derive a Wald estimator, δe/δf . However, as license fees are constant within states, we
would obtain estimates for δf that are very close to zero. Despite small levels of δe, one would mechanically produce
Wald estimators with a large variance in absolute terms. We therefore focus on δe, the ‘reduced form’ effect.
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state taxes. Variation in the state taxes creates border differentials in fees. Exploiting these border
discontinuities, we identify a robust, positive effect of fees on evasion. Our preferred estimate suggests
that a one percent higher fee increases the evasion rate by 0.3 percentage points.
The effect captures a large extensive margin response which is consistent with the few studies that
identify large (intensive margin) evasion responses (e.g. Fisman and Wei, 2004; Gorodnichenko et al.,
2009). Based on our central estimate one can also derive the revenue maximizing ‘Laffer fee’ which
would be roughly twice the average fee observed in our data (see Berger et al., 2015). This observation
renders our result different from those in Fisman and Wei (2004), who find such a large evasion response
which imply that lower taxes (and, in their case, tariffs) could in fact increase revenues. From a more
general point of view, our results strongly support the intuition that higher taxes trigger more evasion
and that these evasion responses are quantitatively sizable.
Concerning the external validity of our findings, one should note that we analyze the binary choice
to evade a fee. As highlighted by our theoretical framework, the way that economic incentives shape
this choice resembles the familiar income tax evasion context. We therefore think that our result
tells something generally, i.e., that evasion does respond to the potential gains from cheating. One
might nevertheless argue that the evasion of license fees is specific, as the fees are associated with
one specific public service. Such usage fees, however, are quite common and apply to a vast array
of publicly provided goods and services which are not fully excludable (think of, e.g., free-riding on
public transport). Moreover, many of these goods and services are at least partially funded through
the general tax pool. Whether a more or less salient link between the payment of fees or taxes and
the ‘service in return’ affects the responsiveness of evasion with respect to the level of the payment,
remains an open question for future research.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Basic Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.D.
Evasion Rate 0.045 0.077
Enforcement Rate 0.012 0.025
Annual Fees 238.122 19.916
Households (Hi) 1,521 5,802
Labor Income 30,496 3,274
Distance (minutes) 40.980 24.408
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the evasion rate, an-
nual license fees (nominal Euro values), the enforcement rate, and se-
lected municipality characteristics (see Online Appendix). Number of
observations: 2,380.
Table 2: Cross-Sectional Estimation
Coefficients Clustered SEs Robust SEs
log(Fees) 0.129 [0.087] [0.022]
Enforcement Rate −0.273 [0.169] [0.072]
log(Income) −0.017 [0.034] [0.028]
Self-Employed 0.215 [0.084] [0.046]
Observations 2,378
R2 0.298
Notes: Results from OLS regressions of equation (4). Additional control variables are
included. The full estimation output is reported in the Online Appendix. Bootstrapped
clustered standard errors (based on Cameron et al. (2008)’s Wild Cluster Bootstrap-t
procedure; 2,000 replications) and robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
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Table 3: Austrian state borders
Number of Border-municip. Variables with significant differences Included
Border (low/high-fee) municipalities groups p ≤ 0.01 p ≤ 0.05 in main sample
Upper/Lower Austria 46 18 0 2 Yes
Upper Austria/Salzburg 39 14 0 2 Yes
Salzburg/Styria 20 6 1 2 Yes
Vorarlberg/Tyrol 9 3 1 1 Yes
Tyrol/Salzburg 28 12 1 5 No
Lower Austria/Burgenland 50 22 2 3 No
Upper Austria/Styria 27 7 3 7 No
Tyrol/Carinthia 17 5 3 7 No
Salzburg/Carinthia 17 5 3 8 No
Lower Austria/Styria 32 12 3 12 No
Burgenland/Styria 36 16 6 12 No
Carinthia/Styria 32 11 6 13 No
Notes: The table shows the number of municipalities and municipality groups at each border. It further displays the
results from balancing tests, indicating the number of variables (out of 41) that show significant differences, i.e., an
estimated ρ that is significant at the 1%- or, at least at the 5%-level, respectively.
Table 4: Border Notch Estimations
Sample Main Sample All Borders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Fees) 0.329??? 0.363??? 0.290?? 0.276??? 0.289??? 0.278???
[0.083] [0.087] [0.128] [0.064] [0.064] [0.067]
Border FEs Yes No No Yes No No
Border-municip. group FEs No Yes (41) Yes (41) No Yes (123) Yes (123)
Control variables No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 113 113 113 342 342 342
R2 0.146 0.422 0.752 0.110 0.400 0.551
Notes: Results from OLS regressions of equation (6). The sample in columns (1)–(3) includes all municipalities located
at the borders of the main sample (see Section 5.1). Columns (4)–(6) includes all bordering municipalities from the
full sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ???, ??indicates significance at the 1%, 5%-level, respectively.
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Table 5: Local Linear Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main sample Full sample
Discontinuity in Evasion Rate 0.044 0.054 0.060 0.063
[0.012] [0.016] [0.012] [0.013]
Discontinuity in log(Fees) 0.156 0.160 0.099 0.100
[0.001] [0.001] [0.006] [0.006 ]
Wald Estimator 0.283 0.336 0.611 0.625
[0.074] [0.101] [0.131] [0.138]
Bandwidth (in minutes) 51.44 26.79 35.59 33.04
Observations 1,133 1,133 2,277 2,277
Notes: Estimates from local linear regressions using a triangle kernel. Columns (1) and
(2) consider the main border sample, columns (3) and (4) the full sample. In columns
(1) and (3), the bandwidth choice follows Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Columns (2)
and (4) set the bandwidth according to Calonico et al. (2014). Regressions include border
fixed-effects. Standard errors in parenthesis. All estimates are significant at the 1%-level.
Figure 1: Austrian State Borders
Notes: The state borders in bold indicate the ‘most balanced’ borders.
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Figure 2: Evasion Rates at Borders
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Notes: Average evasion rates among the bordering municipalities at the state borders in the main sample.
The level of annual license fees (in nominal Euro values) is presented on the horizontal axis. The graph
employs a different scale for the fourth border.
Figure 3: Discontinuity in Fees
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Notes: Yearly TV license fees for municipalities within a 60 minutes driving distance to the closest state
border in the main sample (N = 751). The bin size is 5 minutes. Municipalities with a negative [positive]
distance are located on the low [high] fee side of a border. Fitted lines from local linear regressions of
equation (7) (excluding border fixed effects; bandwidth chosen according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman,
2012) together with the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 4: Discontinuity in Evasion Rates
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Notes: Evasion rates for municipalities within a 60 minutes driving distance to the closest state border
in the main sample (N = 751). The bin size is 5 minutes. Municipalities with a negative [positive]
distance are located on the low [high] fee side of a border. Fitted lines from local linear regressions of
equation (8) (excluding border fixed-effects; bandwidth chosen according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman,
2012) together with the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 5: Local Linear Regression Outcomes for different Bandwidths
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Notes: The figure plots Wald estimators and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals for local linear
regressions, varying the bandwidth from 20 to 80 minuntes in one-minute steps. The dashed horizontal
line illustrates the estimate from column (1), Table 5.
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Figure 6: Placebo Tests for Discontinuity in Evasion Rate
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Notes: The figure plots the cumulative distribution function for 1000 estimated discontinuities in evasion rates (δe) at
randomly generated borders. It presents the c.d.f. for non-parametric estimates, similar to those from column (1) in
Table 5, where for each random border draw, the optimal bandwidth is chosen according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012). All estimates are based on Euclidian rather than driving distances. The sample and number of observations is
similar to our main sample. The dashed, vertical line indicates the estimated discontinuity in the evasion rate at the actual
borders (using Euclidian distance).
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Distribution of key municipality characteristics
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Notes: The figure explores possible border discontinuities for several key variables – in particular the enforcement rate, the
rate of secondary residences (see Section 2), population growth and density as well as the rate of self-employed and average
wage incomes. The figure illustrates the distribution of these variables among municipalities within a 60 minutes driving
distance to the closest state border in the main sample. Municipalities with a negative [positive] distance are located on
the low [high] fee side of a border. Bin size is 5 minutes. Fitted lines from local linear regressions (with a bandwidth chosen
according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012) together with the 95% confidence interval.
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Table A.1: Border-by-Border Balancing Tests
(1) SOE (2) NOE (3) OST (4) NST (5) BST (6) KST (7) SST (8) KS (9) TK (10) TS (11) VT (12) NB
Enforcement Rate 0.014 0.010? −0.002 −0.005 0.004 −0.012?? −0.020 0.002 −0.025? −0.005 −0.054??? −0.017???
[0.010] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.016] [0.009] [0.012] [0.013] [0.008] [0.006]
log(Income) 0.008 −0.026 0.006 −0.027 −0.017 0.011 −0.048??? 0.027 0.018 0.006 −0.102 −0.025
[0.023] [0.024] [0.022] [0.020] [0.019] [0.021] [0.008] [0.022] [0.032] [0.025] [0.086] [0.019]
Self-Employed 0.002 0.026 0.003 0.006 0.029??? 0.052?? 0.013 0.052?? 0.033 −0.032 0.013 0.021??
[0.011] [0.018] [0.023] [0.018] [0.009] [0.020] [0.026] [0.019] [0.041] [0.019] [0.057] [0.008]
Second Residences −0.048? 0.020 −0.049 −0.084?? 0.003 −0.016 0.009 −0.016 0.020?? 0.007 −0.010 0.018
[0.026] [0.012] [0.037] [0.036] [0.008] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.008] [0.048] [0.084] [0.014]
log(PopSize) 0.241 −0.255 −0.231 −0.319 0.218 −1.195??? −0.191 0.019 0.464 −0.013 −0.269 0.081
[0.224] [0.234] [0.343] [0.242] [0.221] [0.217] [0.392] [0.327] [0.286] [0.285] [0.824] [0.176]
PopDensity 0.210 −1.032 −0.329 −0.286 −0.055 −0.083?? −0.082 −0.092 −0.191? −0.014 −0.033 −0.481
[0.188] [0.687] [0.416] [0.201] [0.208] [0.036] [0.088] [0.054] [0.100] [0.058] [0.040] [0.355]
PopGrowth 0.010 −0.002 0.015? 0.001 −0.002 0.006 −0.004 −0.027?? −0.035? −0.015 0.047 −0.003
[0.010] [0.007] [0.008] [0.014] [0.011] [0.008] [0.013] [0.010] [0.020] [0.009] [0.068] [0.010]
PopGrowthGross −0.001 −0.016? −0.002 −0.014 0.013? 0.004 −0.005 −0.011?? −0.000 −0.002 −0.009 −0.002
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.014] [0.007] [0.005] [0.010] [0.005] [0.009] [0.006] [0.011] [0.005]
Notes: The table reports balancing tests based on equation (5) for different state borders (SOE: Upper Austria/Salzburg; NOE: Upper/Lower Austria; OST: Upper Austria/Styria; NST: Lower Austria/Styria;
BST: Burgenland/Styria; KST: Carinthia/Styria; SST: Salzburg/Styria; KS: Salzburg/Carinthia; TK: Tyrol/Carinthia; TS: Tyrol/Salzburg; VT: Vorarlberg/Tyrol; NB: Lower Austria/Burgenland). The
Enforcement Rate measures the ratio of enforced registrations to the total number of households in a municipality; The log(Income) is based on average incomes from salaries and wages; Self-Employed captures
the share of Self-Employed relative to a municipality’s total population; Second Residences gives the number of all secondary and holiday residences relative to all residences; PopGrowth is the percentage
increase in the population between 2001 and 2005; PopGrowthGross is the gross population growth (in percentage), based on the number of persons moving into a municipality from outside. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. ???,??,?indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
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Table A.2: Tests for Discontinuities in Municipality Characteristics
Main Sample Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
30min 40min 50min 30min 40min 50min
Enforcement Rate −0.000 0.001 0.002 −0.003 −0.001 −0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
log(Income) 0.007 0.013 0.007 −0.016 −0.006 −0.008
[0.024] [0.020] [0.018] [0.016] [0.014] [0.012]
Self-Employed −0.001 −0.005 −0.002 0.016? 0.013 0.013?
[0.018] [0.014] [0.012] [0.010] [0.008] [0.007]
Second Residences −0.013 −0.010 −0.009 −0.011 −0.011 −0.015?
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.009]
log(PopSize) 0.203 0.184 0.092 0.233 0.208? 0.163
[0.234] [0.198] [0.175] [0.145] [0.120] [0.104]
PopDensity −0.239 −0.171 −0.014 −0.546? −0.209 0.086
[0.553] [0.473] [0.440] [0.298] [0.249] [0.232]
PopGrowth 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.005
[0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004]
PopGrowthGross −0.011 −0.011? −0.011?? −0.001 −0.001 −0.002
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Notes: The table reports local linear regression estimates for different bandwidths and samples
(standard errors in parentheses). The Enforcement Rate measures the ratio of enforced registra-
tions to the total number of households in a municipality; The log(Income) is based on average
incomes from salaries and wages; Self-Employed captures the share of Self-Employed relative to
a municipality’s total population; Second Residences gives the number of all secondary and holi-
day residences relative to all residences; PopGrowth is the percentage increase in the population
between 2001 and 2005; PopGrowthGross is the gross population growth (in percentage), based
on the number of persons moving into a municipality from outside. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. ??,? indicates significance at the 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
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I. Data
(I.A) Data sources and summary statistics
We compiled municipality data and regional characteristics from various data sources. Fee Information
Service (FIS) provided us with data on TV license fees and state taxes, the number of registered
households and enforcement activities during 2005. As described in the main text, the evasion rate
is given by the ratio of non-registered households to the total number of households (see Section 2).
Hi, the number of households in 2005 is calculated by inflating the 2001 census data on households
by the 2001-2005 population growth in each municipality. The annual fees are the total fees due in
2005 in nominal Euro values. The variable includes federal and state taxes. The enforcement rate is
computed as the ratio of enforced registrations generated by door-to-door controls of FIS’ enforcement
division relative to the total number of households in each municipality.
We obtained a rich set of municipality characteristics from Statistics Austria and other official data
sources. From the Austrian payroll tax statistics we retrieved data on the (log of) average Income
from wages and salaries. (Data an total incomes are only available at the county (‘Bezirk ’) level.)
The variable secondary residences captures the share of secondary and holiday residences (relative to
the sum of primary and secondary residences) in a municipality. The (log of) Popsize denotes the
2005 population size, PopDensity is calculated by the ratio of the municipality’s population to the
area (in hectare), PopGrowth as the percentage increase in the population between 2001 and 2005.
For the year 2005 we also have data on the number of people moving into a municipality from outside,
which allows us to compute the gross population growth for the year 2005 (PopGrowthGross). A
municipality’s age structure is captured by the share of young (up to 35 years, Age Young), middle
(35–55 years, Age Mid) and older (above 55 years, Age Old) household heads in the last available
census data from 2001. Family status is captured by the variables Fam Single, Fam Married, and Fam
Other (divorced or widowed). HHead Fem reflects the fraction of households with a female household
head. The household size variables measure the share of households with 1-person (HSize Small), 2–4
persons (HSize Mid) and 5 or more persons (HSize Large). We also use census data on education, in
particular, the highest degree of the household head. The variables Edu Low, Edu Mid, and Edu High
capture the share with compulsory schooling (9 years), vocational and intermediate schooling (9–12
years), and higher education (high school, college or a university degrees), respectively. A first set of
variables on the occupational situation is again based on census data. These variables indicate the
share of household heads that are employed (Occ Empl), unemployed (Occ Unempl) or retired (Occ
Other). The share of Self-Employed is based on the fraction of all self-employed persons (taken from
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the Austrian labor force statistics) relative to the municipality’s total population. Student captures
the share of University students in a municipality. Variables on the religious affiliation (Religion Cath,
Religion Prot, Religion Other) measure the population share of Catholics, Protestants and others
(including Jews, Buddhist, Hindus, Muslims and people with no confession). To control for political
attitudes, we collected data from the election results of the National Assembly in 2006 and computed
the Voter Turnout as well as vote shares: Vote Right (for right parties: Bu¨ndnis Zukunft O¨sterreich,
Freiheitliche Partei, Liste Dr. Martin), Vote Center (Volkspartei, Sozialdemokratische Partei) and
Vote Left (Gru¨ne, Kommunistische Partei). A further set of variables captured building and property
structure. Residential buildings are classified by their number of housing units into small (Dwelling
Small, 1 apartment), intermediate (Dwelling Mid, 2–5 apartments) and large (Dwelling Large, more
than 5 apartments) dwellings. The corresponding variables indicate the share of these different types.
Our data on the property structure allow us to distinguish between owner-occupied houses (Prop
Ownhouse) and flats (Prop Ownflat), rental property (Prop Rent) and others (Prop Others). We also
collected data on yearly water charges per household, a fee that is determined at the municipality
level. Finally, we also observe the (log of the) absolute Altitude of the municipalities.
Our RDD is based on the distance of each municipality to the closest state border (more precisely,
to the closest one among our main borders or, for the full sample, to the closest among all state
borders). Our primary distance measure is the driving time in minutes from a municipality to the
nearest point at a state border. The variable, which we obtained from WIGeoGIS (a Vienna based
GIS company), was computed in several steps: First, the midpoint of the area polygon for each
municipality was determined. Second, all intersections of roads with state borders were determined.
Third, all of these intersection points were considered as potential targets for calculating the minimum
driving distance from each municipality midpoint. This process identified the ‘closest’ state border
in terms of shortest driving time. Driving time was calculated using realistic average speed levels
(conditional on the type of road). As an alternative distance measure, we also computed the simple,
Euclidean (as the crow flies) distance from each municipality midpoint to the closest state border in
kilometer (see Table III.5). The placebo regressions in Section 5 compute this Euclidean distance to
‘virtual’ state borders.
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Table I.1: Descriptive Statistics of Muncipality Characteristics
Variable Mean S.D.
Data from FIS
Evasion Rate 0.045 0.077
Annual Fees 238.122 19.916
Enforcement Rate 0.012 0.025
Data from Official Statistics
log(Income) 10.320 0.100
Self-Employed 0.154 0.057
Second Residences 0.061 0.063
log(PopSize) 7.432 0.952
PopDensity 2.240 12.011
PopGrowth 0.007 0.037
PopGrowthGross 0.047 0.024
Age Young 0.168 0.034
Age Mid 0.522 0.046
Age Old 0.310 0.049
Fam Single 0.435 0.044
Fam Married 0.456 0.032
Fam Other 0.108 0.028
HHead Fem 0.178 0.052
HSize Small 0.092 0.037
HSize Mid 0.659 0.084
HSize Large 0.256 0.107
Edu Low 0.766 0.082
Edu Mid 0.128 0.039
Edu High 0.107 0.068
Occ Empl 0.447 0.031
Occ Unempl 0.023 0.013
Occ Other 0.083 0.024
Student 0.013 0.007
Religion Cath 0.868 0.119
Religion Prot 0.038 0.083
Religion Other 0.093 0.079
Vote Turnout 0.773 0.063
Vote Right 0.167 0.066
Vote Center 0.756 0.082
Vote Left 0.078 0.041
Dwelling Small 0.593 0.189
Dwelling Mid 0.287 0.128
Dwelling Large 0.120 0.153
Prop Ownhouse 0.655 0.161
Prop Ownflat 0.052 0.062
Prop Rent 0.170 0.134
Prop Other 0.123 0.051
Water Charge 128.112 89.143
log(Altitude) 6.110 0.538
Distance Measure
Driving Distance (min) 40.981 24.408
Euclidean Distance (km) 24.341 17.588
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for all variables
used in the analyses. The number of observations is 2,380 except
for Self-Employed (N = 2, 378) and Water Charge (N = 1, 913).
Sources: FIS, Statistik Austria, WIGeoGIS.
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(I.B) Border-Municipality Group Fixed Effects
This appendix describes the procedure of assigning border municipalities into different groups (un-
derlying the border-municipality fixed effects introduced in Section 5). The sample for this exercise
is composed of municipalities which are located right at a state border. Among these municipalities,
the formation of groups — mainly pairs, but also some triples and quadruples of municipalities —
is based on the following steps. First, we identify a joint state border between municipalities from
two different states, {L,R}. Second, we compare the lengths of the state border that is shared be-
tween neighboring municipalities. Consider three municipalities, i (in state L) and two neighboring
municipalities j and k (in state R). To decide whether i is ‘linked’ to j or k, we compare `ij and `ik,
the length of municipality i’s border at the state frontier that is shared with j or k, respectively. If
`ij > `ik, municipality i is linked to j (rather than k) and they form a group. Note that a unilateral
comparison is sufficient to create a link (here from i to j). A group is then defined by all municipalities
that are directly or indirectly linked.
Several possible cases are illustrated in Figure I.1, where the black vertical line indicates a state
border. In situation (a), municipality L1 is linked to R1 (and vice versa) and they form group #1.
At the same time, L2 is linked to R2. However, L2 is also bordering to R3. Given that the largest
part of R3’s state border is shared with L3 (rather than L2), there is no link between R3 and L2. We
thus pair L2 and R2 into group #2 and L3 and R3 into a separate group #3. A quite different case is
described in (b). Here we have two relatively small municipalities on the one and a large neighboring
municipality on the other side of the border. L1 and L2 are both linked to R1. Thus, they form a
group of three municipalities.
Figure I.1: Assigning Municipalities at State Borders into Groups
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
For this exercise, our sample is composed by municipalities which are located right at a state 
border (i.e., municipalities which touch the border directly). Among those municipalities, the 
formation  of municipality  groups  –  i.e.,  pairs,  triples  or  quadruples  –  is  based  on  several 
steps. First of all, we identify a joint state border between municipalities from two different 
states.  Second, we  compare  the  fraction  of  the  state  border  that  is  shared  between  the 
different, tangential municipalities. In this comparison, a broad number of cases can emerge.  
 Several  possible  cases  are  illustrated  in  panel  (a)  of  Figure  \ref{fig:xxx}.  The  black 
vertical line indicates the state border. Along this state border, municipalities L1 and 
R1 have perfectly overlapping borders. Hence, the pair L1 and R1 gets grouped  into 
group $\sharp 1$. In contrast, municipality L2 is not only bordering to R2 but also to 
R3. So potentially, they could form a triple. However, as the  largest fraction of R3’s 
state border is tangential to L3 (and vice versa), we pair L2 and R2 into group $\sharp 
2$ and municipalities L3 and R3 into a separate group $\sharp 3$. 
 A  further possible  case  is described  in panel  (b). Here we have  two  relative  small 
municipalities on  the one  (L1  and  L2)  and  a  large neighboring municipality on  the 
other side of the border (R1). All three would form a joint group. 
 Panel (c) presents a more complex case. L1 borders to R1 and R2, and R2 also shares 
a border with L2. R1 and L1 are clearly linked, as the largest part of R1’s state border 
is shared with L1. At the same time, L1’s largest part of the border coincides with R2’s 
border. Vice versa, R2’s border at the state frontier is shared with L1 (rather than L2).  
Thus, R1‐L1‐R2 belong  into one group. However, since L2’s  largest  junk of the state 
border  is shared with R2, we would also  include L2  into that group.  In this case, all 
four municipalities would form one group. 
 A  small  variation  of  this  last  case  is  presented  in  panel  (d).  Concerning  the  links 
between municipalities  R1,  L1  and  R2  nothing  changes  as  compared  to  panel  (c). 
However, now L2 shares the  largest part of  it’s border at the state  frontier with R3 
(rather than R2). Hence, we would have the triple L1, R1, R2 in one group, and L2 and 
R3 in a different group. 
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Situation (c) presents a further case. R1 is linked to L1, as the largest part of R1’s state border
is shared with L1. At the sa e time, L1’s largest part of the state border coincid s with R2’s border.
Finally, L2’s largest part of the state border is shared with R2, forming a further link. Thus, all four
municipalities are (directly and indirectly) linked: we would ssig all f ur municipalities to one, large
group. Situation (d) presents a variation of the latter case. The links between municipalities R1, L1
and R2 do not change as compared to panel (c). However, the longest part of L2’s state border is now
shared with R3 (rather than R2). W thus have ne group formed by the triplet L1, R1, R2, and a
second group by the pair L2 and R3.
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Following this procedure, we assign the 113 [342] municipalities at the four most balanced borders
[at all borders] into 42 [123] groups. All of these groups are non-overlapping, i.e., each municipality is
only assigned to one group.
II. Balancing Tests
(II.A) Border-by-Border Balancing Tests
Table II.1 presents the estimated ρ’s from equation (5) for 41 different variables and 12 different
borders. Each estimated coefficient is based on a separate regression. The abbreviations for the
borders used in Table II.1 are defined as follows:
(1) Upper Austria/Salzburg SOE (7) Salzburg/Styria SST
(2) Upper/Lower Austria NOE (8) Salzburg/Carinthia KS
(3) Upper Austria/Styria OST (9) Tyrol/Carinthia TK
(4) Lower Austria/Styria NST (10) Tyrol/Salzburg TS
(5) Burgenland/Styria BST (11) Vorarlberg/Tyrol VT
(6) Carinthia/Styria KST (12) Lower Austria/Burgenland NB
The estimates do not indicate any systematic differences in enforcement rates: at 10 out of the
12 borders, there are no significant differences in the enforcement rate; for one border there are
more enforcement activities on its high-fee side (p ≤ 0.1), for another border there is significantly less
enforcement on the high-fee side (p ≤ 0.01). The balancing tests also fail to detect systematic evidence
on household sorting according to fees: considering two mobility variables (net population growth and
population influx) we find statistically significant but quantitatively small differences at four state
borders (two with p ≤ 0.05, two with p ≤ 0.01): two cases with more, two cases with less population
influx into the low-fee side of a border. Note that these four borders are excluded from our primary
sample. A further important variable in our balancing tests is the number of secondary residences
(see Section 2). This variable is again well balanced in the primary sample defined in Table 3. The
same holds for the income from wages and salaries.
Taking a look at other municipality characteristics, Table II.1 reveals several significant differences.
For none of these variables, however, we detect a systematic heterogeneity that is correlated with the
level of license fees: for a given x, the sign of ρ varies between the different borders rather than
showing a consistent and systematic positive or negative difference for Di. Moreover, and in line with
the discussion from above, the observed differences are primarily concentrated at state borders that
are defined along the Alps.
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Table II.1: Balancing Tests
(1) SOE (2) NOE (3) OST (4) NST (5) BST (6) KST (7) SST (8) KS (9) TK (10) TS (11) VT (12) NB
Enforcement Rate 0.014 0.010? −0.002 −0.005 0.004 −0.012?? −0.020 0.002 −0.025? −0.005 −0.054??? −0.017???
[0.010] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.016] [0.009] [0.012] [0.013] [0.008] [0.006]
log(Income) 0.008 −0.026 0.006 −0.027 −0.017 0.011 −0.048??? 0.027 0.018 0.006 −0.102 −0.025
[0.023] [0.024] [0.022] [0.020] [0.019] [0.021] [0.008] [0.022] [0.032] [0.025] [0.086] [0.019]
Self-Employed 0.002 0.026 0.003 0.006 0.029??? 0.052?? 0.013 0.052?? 0.033 −0.032 0.013 0.021??
[0.011] [0.018] [0.023] [0.018] [0.009] [0.020] [0.026] [0.019] [0.041] [0.019] [0.057] [0.008]
Second Residences −0.048? 0.020 −0.049 −0.084?? 0.003 −0.016 0.009 −0.016 0.020?? 0.007 −0.010 0.018
[0.026] [0.012] [0.037] [0.036] [0.008] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.008] [0.048] [0.084] [0.014]
log(PopSize) 0.241 −0.255 −0.231 −0.319 0.218 −1.195??? −0.191 0.019 0.464 −0.013 −0.269 0.081
[0.224] [0.234] [0.343] [0.242] [0.221] [0.217] [0.392] [0.327] [0.286] [0.285] [0.824] [0.176]
PopDensity 0.210 −1.032 −0.329 −0.286 −0.055 −0.083?? −0.082 −0.092 −0.191? −0.014 −0.033 −0.481
[0.188] [0.687] [0.416] [0.201] [0.208] [0.036] [0.088] [0.054] [0.100] [0.058] [0.040] [0.355]
PopGrowth 0.010 −0.002 0.015? 0.001 −0.002 0.006 −0.004 −0.027?? −0.035? −0.015 0.047 −0.003
[0.010] [0.007] [0.008] [0.014] [0.011] [0.008] [0.013] [0.010] [0.020] [0.009] [0.068] [0.010]
PopGrowthGross −0.001 −0.016? −0.002 −0.014 0.013? 0.004 −0.005 −0.011?? −0.000 −0.002 −0.009 −0.002
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.014] [0.007] [0.005] [0.010] [0.005] [0.009] [0.006] [0.011] [0.005]
Age Young 0.005 0.010 −0.002 0.001 0.021? −0.008 −0.000 −0.002 −0.003 0.017? 0.067 0.013
[0.007] [0.009] [0.012] [0.010] [0.012] [0.010] [0.018] [0.017] [0.016] [0.009] [0.045] [0.009]
Age Mid 0.019 0.013 0.012 0.025 −0.008 0.002 0.005 0.011 0.036 0.001 −0.042 −0.008
[0.011] [0.012] [0.019] [0.019] [0.010] [0.014] [0.019] [0.018] [0.027] [0.009] [0.034] [0.010]
Age Old −0.024? −0.023? −0.011 −0.026 −0.013 0.006 −0.004 −0.010 −0.033 −0.017? −0.025 −0.006
[0.012] [0.013] [0.018] [0.021] [0.014] [0.014] [0.021] [0.018] [0.029] [0.010] [0.032] [0.010]
Fam Single 0.006 0.001 0.018 0.024?? 0.016?? 0.013 0.009 0.013 −0.012 −0.020? 0.009 0.008
[0.006] [0.007] [0.011] [0.011] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.015] [0.017] [0.011] [0.038] [0.006]
Fam Married 0.009? 0.004 −0.012 −0.003 −0.004 −0.007 −0.011 −0.015 −0.007 0.020?? −0.001 −0.004
[0.005] [0.005] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008] [0.010] [0.009] [0.013] [0.015] [0.009] [0.038] [0.005]
Fam Other −0.014?? −0.005 −0.007 −0.021? −0.013?? −0.005 0.002 0.002 0.019??? −0.000 −0.008 −0.005
[0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.012] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.005]
HHead Fem −0.009 −0.013 −0.005 −0.022 0.021 0.006 0.026 0.004 0.001 −0.010 −0.012 −0.009
[0.011] [0.014] [0.016] [0.025] [0.015] [0.016] [0.020] [0.026] [0.014] [0.012] [0.030] [0.011]
HSize Small −0.020?? −0.010 −0.024?? −0.038?? 0.004 −0.012 0.004 −0.001 0.005 −0.007 0.010 0.000
[0.008] [0.010] [0.012] [0.017] [0.008] [0.010] [0.012] [0.021] [0.011] [0.010] [0.020] [0.007]
HSize Mid −0.004 −0.006 −0.008 −0.016 −0.017 −0.050? −0.005 −0.009 −0.028 −0.004 −0.049 −0.011
[0.011] [0.030] [0.023] [0.022] [0.021] [0.027] [0.039] [0.032] [0.045] [0.034] [0.087] [0.015]
HSize Large 0.024 0.018 0.029 0.045 0.013 0.062? −0.001 −0.010 0.017 0.006 0.053 0.008
[0.015] [0.038] [0.031] [0.033] [0.025] [0.032] [0.048] [0.045] [0.055] [0.040] [0.079] [0.019]
Edu Low −0.015 0.016 0.007 0.027? −0.011 −0.003 −0.034 −0.037 0.040 0.037?? −0.009 0.017
[0.021] [0.019] [0.024] [0.014] [0.020] [0.021] [0.022] [0.031] [0.027] [0.016] [0.056] [0.018]
Edu Mid 0.011 −0.001 −0.003 0.010 0.028??? 0.010 0.041?? 0.030 −0.008 −0.021 −0.015 0.007
[0.008] [0.010] [0.017] [0.011] [0.010] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.021] [0.015] [0.031] [0.008]
Edu High 0.004 −0.015 −0.004 −0.037??? −0.017 −0.007 −0.007 0.007 −0.032? −0.016 0.023 −0.024?
[0.017] [0.013] [0.013] [0.009] [0.012] [0.010] [0.013] [0.019] [0.015] [0.011] [0.035] [0.013]
Occ Empl 0.013? 0.011? −0.013 −0.011 0.008 0.028?? −0.019 −0.014 −0.019? 0.000 −0.033 0.006
[0.008] [0.006] [0.010] [0.011] [0.007] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.009] [0.010] [0.023] [0.007]
Occ Unempl −0.000 −0.003 0.011?? −0.001 −0.005? −0.001 0.014?? 0.002 0.008 −0.003 0.014 −0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.017] [0.009] [0.011] [0.022] [0.002]
Occ Other −0.002 −0.004 0.007 0.029??? −0.006 −0.012? 0.003 0.015 0.004 0.003 0.008 −0.002
[0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.013] [0.007] [0.007] [0.024] [0.005]
Student −0.001 0.000 0.002 −0.004??? −0.001 −0.002 0.003 −0.000 −0.005 0.001 −0.005 −0.001
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.001]
Religion Cath 0.059 0.040? 0.037 0.046 0.213??? 0.050? −0.185 −0.043 −0.005 −0.006 0.034 0.017
[0.041] [0.023] [0.070] [0.034] [0.057] [0.026] [0.110] [0.065] [0.008] [0.018] [0.032] [0.033]
Religion Prot −0.063 −0.004 −0.001 −0.024 −0.221??? −0.041? 0.215? 0.092? 0.009?? 0.004 −0.004 −0.038
[0.040] [0.003] [0.071] [0.022] [0.054] [0.023] [0.105] [0.049] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.025]
Religion Other 0.003 −0.036? −0.036?? −0.022 0.009 −0.009 −0.029? −0.049 −0.004 0.002 −0.030 0.021
[0.015] [0.021] [0.014] [0.022] [0.011] [0.007] [0.016] [0.037] [0.006] [0.014] [0.027] [0.021]
Vote Turnout 0.009 0.014 −0.020 0.005 −0.035?? 0.053??? 0.034 −0.032 0.041 0.071??? 0.038 0.003
[0.010] [0.009] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016] [0.021] [0.019] [0.024] [0.017] [0.036] [0.010]
Vote Right −0.010 −0.017 −0.016 −0.033?? 0.026?? −0.228??? 0.004 0.191??? 0.182??? 0.007 −0.063 0.017?
[0.009] [0.011] [0.017] [0.016] [0.011] [0.020] [0.033] [0.034] [0.038] [0.016] [0.048] [0.010]
Vote Center −0.009 0.029? 0.035? 0.046?? −0.021 0.215??? −0.002 −0.173??? −0.113?? 0.008 0.056 −0.012
[0.016] [0.015] [0.018] [0.018] [0.015] [0.020] [0.038] [0.033] [0.041] [0.020] [0.058] [0.014]
Vote Left 0.018? −0.012 −0.019? −0.013?? −0.004 0.012?? −0.003 −0.017?? −0.069??? −0.014? 0.008 −0.004
[0.011] [0.007] [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.007] [0.016] [0.008] [0.021] [0.007]
Dwelling Small 0.013 0.035 0.092? 0.104?? −0.123??? 0.149??? 0.062 0.035 0.086 −0.031 0.057 −0.056
[0.033] [0.040] [0.053] [0.043] [0.038] [0.052] [0.060] [0.084] [0.052] [0.041] [0.102] [0.035]
Dwelling Mid −0.019 0.032? −0.132??? −0.062?? 0.054?? −0.089??? −0.061? 0.037 −0.043 −0.055 −0.017 0.039?
[0.016] [0.017] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.029] [0.035] [0.053] [0.045] [0.043] [0.059] [0.023]
Dwelling Large 0.006 −0.067? 0.039 −0.042 0.069?? −0.059? −0.001 −0.072 −0.042 0.086? −0.040 0.017
[0.032] [0.038] [0.044] [0.046] [0.031] [0.032] [0.039] [0.065] [0.030] [0.050] [0.067] [0.031]
Prop OwnHouse −0.017 0.082?? 0.054 0.028 −0.099??? 0.060 0.002 0.050 0.012 −0.005 −0.013 −0.054
[0.033] [0.041] [0.046] [0.040] [0.035] [0.039] [0.058] [0.071] [0.038] [0.029] [0.049] [0.034]
Prop OwnFlat 0.027 −0.001 0.051?? −0.000 0.023? 0.019 0.012 −0.059??? −0.082?? −0.040?? 0.002 0.011
[0.019] [0.011] [0.020] [0.016] [0.011] [0.015] [0.017] [0.020] [0.029] [0.019] [0.034] [0.011]
Prop Rent 0.007 −0.094?? −0.025 −0.035 0.058? −0.057?? −0.008 −0.006 0.036 0.031 −0.038 0.023
[0.026] [0.041] [0.046] [0.036] [0.030] [0.025] [0.041] [0.059] [0.026] [0.024] [0.052] [0.032]
Prop Other −0.018 0.013 −0.080??? 0.007 0.018 −0.022 −0.006 0.015 0.034 0.015 0.050 0.019
[0.012] [0.012] [0.017] [0.016] [0.011] [0.014] [0.019] [0.025] [0.020] [0.016] [0.052] [0.014]
Water Charge −33.603 −35.661 −10.960 −48.708?? 33.289 −31.082 35.937 17.992 −39.944 3.065 −424.115 105.490???
[42.697] [25.134] [27.462] [18.480] [36.097] [27.827] [64.664] [92.619] [24.809] [42.716] [307.456] [17.704]
log(Altitude) 0.074 0.161 0.254??? 0.093 0.066 0.266?? −0.055 0.017 0.144 −0.174?? 0.170 0.136
[0.066] [0.137] [0.085] [0.076] [0.084] [0.100] [0.054] [0.096] [0.121] [0.076] [0.131] [0.127]
1% Significance 0 0 3 3 6 6 1 3 3 1 1 2
5% Significance 2 2 4 9 6 7 1 4 4 4 0 1
Notes: The table reports balancing tests based on equation (5) for different state borders. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ???,??,?indicates
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
(II.B) Distribution of Municipality Characteristics around Borders
This section first presents additional graphical evidence on the distribution of municipality character-
istics around the borders of the main sample (complementary to Figure A.1). Figure II.1 considers
variables that turned out to be significantly correlated with the evasion rate in the cross-sectional
analysis (see Table III.2). For the fraction of small and large households, we do not detect any dis-
continuities. For two variables that describe the family structure, the share of single and married
household heads, the distributions look again fairly balanced around the border. The graphs indicate
slightly fewer married people on the low-fee side of the border, however, the discontinuity is insignifi-
cant and the impression is mainly due to the strong curvature from the quadratic model fit. A similar
pattern emerges for the age structure, where we observe a slightly higher share of young people (below
age 35) on the high-fee side of the border. The differential is again insignificant and seems to be
driven by several outliers in the first bin on the ‘right hand side’ of the border. Mirroring the high
share of younger people, we do observe significantly fewer old people on the high fee side of the border
(see Table II.2). Finally, the share of single-family houses, a variable on the dwelling structure that is
significantly correlated with evasion, is again smoothly distributed around the border.
In a next step, we run placebo estimations that analyze possible discontinuities in all other munic-
ipality characteristics. (Note that income is not included in the placebo tests, as the variable is not
available at the municipality level.) The results from this exercise are presented in Table II.2, where
each point estimate comes from a separate regression. Columns (1)–(3) [and (7)–(9)] report estimated
differentials at the border for the main [full] sample based on local linear regressions with a bandwidth
of 30, 40, and 50 minutes, respectively. (These values cover the range of bandwidths suggested by the
methods from Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) and Calonico et al. (2014), respectively.) Columns
(4)–(6) [and (10)–(12)] present parametric RDD estimates in the spirit of equation (III.1), considering
linear, quadratic and cubic trends in distance.
Consistent with the graphical evidence from Figure A.1, the regression analysis does not detect
any border differential in one of the key variables: the enforcement rate, the share of secondary
residences and the population growth does not significantly change at the border. Table II.2 reports
some statistically significant differences for the population influx in 2005 in the main sample. However,
these differences are not robust across different specifications.
Hence, for the main sample, we are not too far from an ideal situation with a perfectly smooth
distribution of characteristics around the borders. We only detect robust border differentials for two
out of the 41 variables considered: there are fewer old individuals living on the high-fee side of the
border, and fewer households that rent (rather than own) the property they live in. Note that these
two characteristics are not significantly correlated with the evasion rate (see Table III.2).
For the full sample that includes all state borders, the enforcement rate and other important
correlates of the evasion rate seem again smoothly distributed. Given our approach to derive the main
estimation sample (see Section 5), it is not surprising that we observe more significant differentials
when we turn to the full sample. This concerns in particular the educational and the religious structure.
Note, however, that these are again dimensions that only display a weak, insignificant predictive power
in the cross-sectional analysis (see Table III.2). Hence, while less close to an ideal case with perfectly
smooth distributions of municipality characteristics, the full sample still seems reasonably suited for
our RDD analysis.
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Figure II.1: Distribution of additional municipality characteristics
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Notes: The figure illustrates the distribution of selected variables among municipalities within a 60 minutes driving distance
to the closest state border in the main sample. Municipalities with a negative [positive] distance are located on the low [high]
fee side of a border. Bin size is 5 minutes. Fitted lines from local linear regressions (with a bandwidth chosen according to
Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012) together with the 95% confidence interval.
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Table II.2: Tests for Discontinuities in Observable Characteristics
Main Sample Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
30min 40min 50min linear quadratic cubic 30min 40min 50min linear quadratic cubic
Enforcement Rate −0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.003 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 0.001 −0.005
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005]
log(Income) 0.007 0.013 0.007 −0.017 0.027 0.016 −0.016 −0.006 −0.008 −0.011 −0.011 0.003
[0.024] [0.020] [0.018] [0.014] [0.023] [0.034] [0.016] [0.014] [0.012] [0.010] [0.016] [0.024]
Self-Employed −0.001 −0.005 −0.002 0.015 −0.018 −0.001 0.016? 0.013 0.013? 0.013?? 0.014 0.013
[0.018] [0.014] [0.012] [0.010] [0.016] [0.025] [0.010] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.014]
Second Residences −0.013 −0.010 −0.009 −0.010 −0.008 −0.017 −0.011 −0.011 −0.015? −0.027??? −0.003 −0.006
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.015] [0.015] [0.012] [0.010] [0.009] [0.007] [0.012] [0.016]
log(PopSize) 0.203 0.184 0.092 −0.095 0.247 0.330 0.233 0.208? 0.163 0.066 0.217 0.373?
[0.234] [0.198] [0.175] [0.149] [0.229] [0.333] [0.145] [0.120] [0.104] [0.089] [0.141] [0.209]
PopDensity −0.239 −0.171 −0.014 0.052 −0.009 −0.489 −0.546? −0.209 0.086 0.609??? −0.382 −0.900??
[0.553] [0.473] [0.440] [0.396] [0.555] [0.776] [0.298] [0.249] [0.232] [0.221] [0.304] [0.455]
PopGrowth 0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.003 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004 −0.001
[0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.013] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009]
PopGrowthGross −0.011 −0.011? −0.011?? −0.011??? −0.012? −0.006 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 −0.003 0.003
[0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.010] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.006]
Age Young 0.014? 0.011 0.010? 0.005 0.012 0.018 0.015?? 0.014??? 0.016??? 0.016??? 0.017??? 0.009
[0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.011] [0.007] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009]
Age Mid 0.016 0.014? 0.011 0.007 0.015 0.015 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004
[0.010] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.015] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.010]
Age Old −0.030??? −0.025??? −0.021??? −0.013? −0.027??? −0.033?? −0.019?? −0.019?? −0.020??? −0.021??? −0.020?? −0.013
[0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.013] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.009] [0.013]
Fam Single −0.001 −0.002 −0.000 0.006 −0.005 −0.004 0.011 0.011? 0.014?? 0.018??? 0.011 0.004
[0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.012] [0.008] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.011]
Fam Married 0.011? 0.008 0.005 −0.001 0.009 0.016? −0.003 −0.004 −0.007? −0.013??? −0.003 0.002
[0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.008]
Fam Other −0.009? −0.006 −0.005 −0.005 −0.004 −0.011 −0.008? −0.007? −0.007?? −0.005?? −0.008? −0.007
[0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007]
HHead Fem −0.014 −0.006 −0.001 0.002 0.000 −0.029 −0.002 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.006 −0.005
[0.013] [0.011] [0.009] [0.008] [0.012] [0.018] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.012]
HSize Small −0.015? −0.009 −0.008 −0.009? −0.006 −0.016 −0.007 −0.004 −0.004 −0.006? −0.001 −0.006
[0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.011] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.008]
HSize Mid −0.008 −0.002 −0.008 −0.039??? 0.020 −0.006 −0.009 −0.010 −0.018? −0.034??? −0.007 0.008
[0.028] [0.023] [0.019] [0.014] [0.025] [0.039] [0.015] [0.012] [0.011] [0.009] [0.014] [0.022]
HSize Large 0.022 0.012 0.017 0.049??? −0.013 0.021 0.015 0.013 0.021 0.039??? 0.007 −0.004
[0.033] [0.027] [0.023] [0.018] [0.030] [0.046] [0.019] [0.015] [0.013] [0.011] [0.018] [0.027]
Edu Low −0.003 −0.018 −0.026? −0.024?? −0.031? 0.017 0.005 −0.009 −0.016? −0.021??? −0.013 0.015
[0.017] [0.015] [0.014] [0.012] [0.018] [0.024] [0.012] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.012] [0.018]
Edu Mid −0.000 0.008 0.018?? 0.032??? 0.011 −0.025?? 0.012? 0.018??? 0.024??? 0.029??? 0.022??? −0.002
[0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.012] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.010]
Edu High 0.003 0.010 0.008 −0.007 0.020 0.008 −0.017? −0.009 −0.008 −0.007 −0.010 −0.013
[0.013] [0.012] [0.010] [0.009] [0.014] [0.019] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.013]
Occ Empl 0.010 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.012 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.007? 0.008??? 0.007 0.007
[0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.011] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.008]
Occ Unempl −0.005?? −0.004 −0.003 −0.001 −0.004 −0.005 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
Occ Other −0.003 −0.002 −0.002 0.000 −0.004 −0.001 −0.004 −0.005? −0.005?? −0.003 −0.008?? −0.002
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.008] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.005]
Student 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Religion Cath 0.008 0.001 0.003 0.037?? −0.029 0.013 0.063??? 0.052??? 0.046??? 0.046??? 0.045?? 0.069??
[0.025] [0.023] [0.020] [0.017] [0.026] [0.034] [0.021] [0.018] [0.016] [0.014] [0.021] [0.029]
Religion Prot 0.017 0.019 0.015 −0.010 0.037?? 0.018 −0.056??? −0.059??? −0.058??? −0.063??? −0.053??? −0.055??
[0.012] [0.014] [0.013] [0.012] [0.017] [0.015] [0.018] [0.015] [0.014] [0.011] [0.018] [0.024]
Religion Other −0.025 −0.020 −0.018 −0.027?? −0.008 −0.030 −0.007 0.006 0.012 0.017?? 0.007 −0.014
[0.019] [0.016] [0.013] [0.011] [0.018] [0.026] [0.013] [0.011] [0.009] [0.008] [0.012] [0.018]
Vote Turnout 0.032?? 0.024? 0.022? 0.016 0.028? 0.032 0.004 0.004 0.002 −0.011? 0.015 −0.002
[0.015] [0.013] [0.011] [0.010] [0.015] [0.021] [0.010] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.010] [0.014]
Vote Right −0.006 −0.006 −0.004 −0.013? 0.008 −0.022 0.014 0.013? 0.016?? 0.015?? 0.019?? 0.003
[0.012] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.012] [0.017] [0.009] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.014]
Vote Center −0.008 −0.011 −0.013 0.005 −0.034?? 0.012 −0.016 −0.018?? −0.023??? −0.024??? −0.025?? −0.004
[0.017] [0.015] [0.013] [0.011] [0.017] [0.025] [0.011] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.011] [0.017]
Vote Left 0.014 0.017?? 0.017?? 0.008 0.026??? 0.010 0.002 0.005 0.007? 0.009?? 0.006 0.000
[0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.012] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.008]
Dwelling Small 0.024 0.012 0.014 0.023 0.008 0.013 −0.040 −0.048? −0.050?? −0.045?? −0.055? −0.041
[0.035] [0.030] [0.026] [0.022] [0.035] [0.050] [0.030] [0.025] [0.022] [0.018] [0.029] [0.043]
Dwelling Mid 0.037?? 0.035?? 0.022 0.006 0.029 0.066?? 0.038? 0.030? 0.020 0.002 0.034? 0.056??
[0.019] [0.016] [0.014] [0.013] [0.019] [0.028] [0.020] [0.017] [0.014] [0.012] [0.019] [0.028]
Dwelling Large −0.062? −0.047 −0.036 −0.030 −0.037 −0.078 0.001 0.019 0.031? 0.043??? 0.021 −0.015
[0.035] [0.030] [0.026] [0.022] [0.034] [0.049] [0.023] [0.019] [0.017] [0.014] [0.023] [0.032]
Prop OwnHouse 0.054 0.036 0.030 0.019 0.036 0.062 −0.027 −0.044?? −0.050??? −0.052??? −0.048? −0.024
[0.036] [0.030] [0.027] [0.022] [0.035] [0.050] [0.025] [0.021] [0.018] [0.015] [0.025] [0.036]
Prop OwnFlat −0.005 0.007 0.014 0.020? 0.011 −0.016 0.005 0.015? 0.020??? 0.027??? 0.014 −0.001
[0.016] [0.014] [0.012] [0.010] [0.016] [0.021] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.009] [0.013]
Prop Rent −0.066?? −0.055?? −0.050?? −0.038?? −0.060?? −0.066 −0.001 0.014 0.022 0.032?? 0.012 −0.007
[0.032] [0.027] [0.023] [0.018] [0.030] [0.045] [0.021] [0.017] [0.015] [0.013] [0.020] [0.029]
Prop Other 0.017 0.011 0.007 −0.001 0.014 0.020 0.022??? 0.015?? 0.008 −0.007 0.022??? 0.032???
[0.012] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.012] [0.017] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.008] [0.011]
Water Charge −109.123 −81.587 −69.461? −57.406?? −71.041 −155.850 −10.201 6.587 11.252 11.565 11.667 −21.349
[73.336] [51.841] [40.543] [24.218] [53.936] [103.936] [32.099] [23.502] [18.981] [12.927] [25.304] [46.163]
log(Altitude) 0.044 0.042 0.039 0.078 −0.012 0.083 0.091 0.080 0.094 0.136?? 0.069 0.036
[0.123] [0.102] [0.089] [0.075] [0.119] [0.177] [0.095] [0.078] [0.067] [0.055] [0.090] [0.135]
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) report local linear regression estimates for different bandwidths (standard errors in parentheses).
Columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) present parametric RDD estimates for different polynomial specifications for municipalities within a
60 minutes driving distance to the closest state border (robust standard errors in parentheses). ???,??,?indicates significance at the
1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
III. Complementary Results
(III.A) TV Ownership and License Fees
As noted above, our measure of evasion does not account for variation in the ownership of broadcasting
equipment (see Section 2.2). This measurement error would become problematic if TV license fees
have a direct (and presumably negative) impact on owning a TV. In this case, our dependent variable
would also capture ‘real’ and not only evasion responses to license fees. To assess this concern,
we study survey data on TV ownership. The survey covers a representative random sample of the
Austrian household population. It was implemented in 2005 by a commercial survey organization
using computer-assisted personal interviewing. To each observation (N = 1, 136) we matched the
level of TV license fees as well as the minimum driving distance to the closest state border (averaged
at the district level).
Table III.1: TV Ownership and license fees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Fees) –0.026 –0.008 –0.006
[0.054] [0.055] [0.055]
Discontinuity 0.003 –0.011 0.023 –0.005
at Border [0.018] [0.020] [0.019] [0.019]
Income 2 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024
[0.022] [0.022] [0.025] [0.025]
Income 3 0.050?? 0.050?? 0.052?? 0.052??
[0.020] [0.020] [0.022] [0.022]
Income 4 0.032 0.033 0.030 0.031
[0.022] [0.022] [0.026] [0.026]
Income 5 0.060??? 0.059??? 0.063??? 0.063???
[0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.024]
Edu Mid –0.016? –0.011 –0.015 –0.015
[0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011]
Edu High –0.038?? –0.027?? –0.032?? –0.032??
[0.016] [0.012] [0.016] [0.016]
Additional control
variables: No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Distance: – – – Linear Quadratic
Observations 1,136 1,112 1,112 908 887 908 887
R2 0.001 0.024 0.033 0.001 0.063 0.001 0.063
Notes: The table reports estimates from a linear probability model explaining TV ownership. In addition to income
and education group dummies, columns (3), (5) and (7) include additional controls for age, gender, and labor market
participation of the respondent as well as dummies for municipality categories (rural/mixed rural/mixed urban). Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ???,??,?indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
Columns (1–3) of Table III.1 presents the estimates from a linear probability model. (Marginal
effects from probit estimates confirm these results.) The results indicate an insignificant negative
correlation between TV license fees and TV ownership. In contrast to the level of license fees, income
and education – which turn out to be the strongest determinants of owning a TV – explain some part
of the variation in TV ownership. When we control for these variables (column 2), the (imprecise)
point estimate indicates that a one percent increase in TV license fees reduces the TV ownership by
10
0.008 percentage points. Hence, the effect is economically irrelevant. This finding does not change
when we add further control variables (column 3).
In a next step, we estimate border discontinuities in TV ownership. Like in the model of equation
(III.2), we account for linear (columns 4 and 5) and quadratic (6 and 7) distance terms which are
allowed to differ on either side of the border. The estimation results document an economically and
statistically insignificant discontinuity in TV ownership at the border. The point estimate from column
(4) suggests that the likelihood of owning a TV increases by 0.3 percentage points when we move from
the low to the high fee side of a border. When we add controls we find an insignificant 1.1 (column
5) or 0.5 (column 7) percentage point decreases in TV ownership.
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(III.B) Cross-Sectional Estimation
Table III.2: Cross-sectional Estimation (full estimation output)
coefficient (SE1) (SE2)
log(Fees) 0.129 [0.087] [0.022]
Enforcement Rate −0.273 [0.169] [0.072]
log(Income) −0.017 [0.034] [0.028]
Self-Employed 0.215?? [0.084] [0.046]
Second Residences −0.209?? [0.083] [0.036]
log(PopSize) −0.003 [0.004] [0.002]
PopDensity 0.000 [0.002] [0.000]
PopGrowth 0.442??? [0.139] [0.059]
PopGrowthGross 0.028 [0.126] [0.084]
HHead Fem −0.106 [0.069] [0.067]
Religion Cath −0.082 [0.100] [0.042]
Religion Prot −0.095 [0.111] [0.047]
Dwelling Small 0.161?? [0.080] [0.025]
Dwelling Large −0.060 [0.109] [0.047]
Vote Turnout −0.067 [0.066] [0.035]
Vote Right −0.039 [0.033] [0.022]
Vote Left −0.061 [0.106] [0.085]
Occ-Empl 0.007 [0.086] [0.072]
Occ-Unempl 0.336 [0.214] [0.226]
Student −0.386 [0.508] [0.368]
Fam-Single 0.739?? [0.369] [0.144]
Fam-Married 0.572? [0.311] [0.152]
HSize-Low 0.773?? [0.313] [0.119]
HSize-High −0.127??? [0.048] [0.035]
Age-Young 0.131?? [0.063] [0.073]
Age-Old 0.023 [0.057] [0.070]
Edu-Low −0.012 [0.049] [0.048]
Edu-High 0.069 [0.100] [0.073]
Prop-Ownhouse −0.040 [0.093] [0.057]
Prop-Ownflat −0.040 [0.104] [0.057]
Prop-Rent 0.007 [0.127] [0.053]
log(Altitude) −0.007 [0.007] [0.005]
Observations 2,378
R2 0.298
Notes: Results from OLS regressions, using the evasion rate as dependent variable.
Column (SE1) reports bootstrapped clustered standard errors based on Cameron
et al. (2008)’s Wild Cluster Bootstrap-t procedure (2,000 replications); (SE2) con-
tains robust standard errors. ???,??,?indicates significance according to the boot-
strapped clustered standard errors at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
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(III.C) Parametric RDD
Complementary to the non-parametric estimates from the main text, we also studied the RDD para-
metrically. More specifically, we estimated the two following specifications of equations (7) and (8):
log(Fees)i = δ
fDi + λ
f
0 +
k¯∑
k=1
λfk dist
k
i +
k¯∑
k=1
ζfk (Di × distki ) + Xiγf + fi (III.1)
and
Evasioni = δ
eDi + λ
e
0 +
k¯∑
k=1
λek dist
k
i +
k¯∑
k=1
ζek(Di × distki ) + Xiγe + ei , (III.2)
where disti is the driving distance to the closest border. Both equations include trends in distance
(up to polynomial degree k¯) that are allowed to differ on either side of the border.
In the spirit of a ‘first-stage’ in an instrumental variable approach, equation (III.1) estimates the
border discontinuity in license fees. This discontinuity is captured by δf . The second equation captures
the reduced form effect of the treatment on the outcome variable, i.e., the effect from being on the
high-fee side of a border on the average evasion rate. As detailed in the main text, this allows us to
compute the Wald estimator βRD = δe/δf . To examine the robustness of this estimator, (i) we vary
the estimation sample by considering different widths around the state borders, (ii) we either include
or omit the control variables Xi and (iii) we study models with linear, quadratic and cubic trends in
distance (k¯ = 1, 2, 3). Following Lee and Lemieux (2010) we compute the Akaike information criterion
(AIC) to assess the quality of the different models.1 The results from this exercise are provided in
Table III.3.
The table presents the estimation output for different specifications of equations (III.1) and (III.2)
and the corresponding result for the Wald estimator, βRD. We consider different samples of munic-
ipalities that are located in a narrow (45min, columns 1 and 2), intermediate (60min, 3 and 4) and
wide range (90min, 5 and 6) around the state borders from the main sample. For each width, we
either exclude or include the vector of control variables. Within each column, we consider models
with linear (panel (a) of the table), quadratic (panel b) and cubic trends (panel c) in the distance
variable. The most preferred model according to the AIC (see Lee and Lemieux, 2010, and fn. 1) is
indicated by a bold Wald estimator.
The results from Table III.3 document an estimated border differential in license fees of 16 to 18
percent. The increase in the fees is accompanied by a discontinuous jump in the evasion rate of 4
to 6 percentage points. In almost all specifications, this latter discontinuity is significant at the 1 or
the 5 percent level. Taken together, the coefficients imply remarkably stable Wald estimators that
center around 0.30. The estimators marked in bold indicate that the linear model tends to perform
well (in terms of AIC) for the smaller sample with a more narrow width around the state borders.
As we consider a broader width and hence a larger sample, first the quadratic and later the cubic
model performs better.2 Independently of the polynomial specifications, the Wald estimators from
the preferred models are all highly significant and fall in the range from 0.25 to 0.33. All of these
results are robust to including border fixed effects.
1We compute the AICs for both, equations (III.1) and (III.2), and bring them on a common scale by computing each
model’s relative probability of minimizing the estimated information loss (Akaike, 1974).
2Models with higher order polynomials, i.e., k¯ > 3, perform worse in terms of AIC but deliver similar results.
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Next, we examine whether our results are specific to the main sample considered so far or whether
the effect of higher fees on evasion generalizes to all state borders. To approach this question, we
replicate the parametric RDD analysis from Table III.3 for the full sample. The results, which are
reported in Table III.4 below, again confirm a highly significant discontinuity in evasion rates at the
state borders. As compared to the analysis for the main sample, however, the estimates are less robust.
Even among the best performing models, we observe semi-elasticities between 0.38 and 0.73. Despite
using a larger sample, the effects are also estimated with larger standard errors than the corresponding
coefficients from Table III.3.
Finally, we examined whether we obtain similar results when we use Euclidean rather than driving
distance (compare the placebo exercise in Section 5). This point is addressed in Table III.5, which
replicates the analysis underlying Table 5 for the alternative distance metric. The comparison shows
that the estimated semi-elasticities are very similar for the main sample – irrespectively of whether
we use driving or Euclidean distance.
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Table III.3: RDD Estimates – Main Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Width around border: ± 45 min ± 60 min ± 90 min
Control variables: No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations: 532 532 751 750 1,133 1,131
(a) Polynom.degree 1 (linear model):
Discontinuity in Evasion Rate 0.040??? 0.050??? 0.050??? 0.057??? 0.029??? 0.051???
(δe) [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.009] [0.009]
Discontinuity in log(Fees) 0.161??? 0.160??? 0.163??? 0.156??? 0.171??? 0.154???
(δf ) [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
Wald Estimator 0.247??? 0.315??? 0.310??? 0.367??? 0.171??? 0.333???
(βRD = δe/δf ) [0.075] [0.077] [0.071] [0.075] [0.055] [0.057]
(b) Polynom.degree 2 (quadratic model):
Discontinuity in Evasion Rate 0.047?? 0.061??? 0.037?? 0.046??? 0.056??? 0.057???
(δe) [0.021] [0.019] [0.018] [0.015] [0.014] [0.012]
Discontinuity in log(Fees) 0.170??? 0.183??? 0.167??? 0.173??? 0.153??? 0.163???
(δf ) [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
Wald Estimator 0.279?? 0.331??? 0.220?? 0.268??? 0.368??? 0.349???
(βRD = δe/δf ) [0.126] [0.104] [0.106] [0.088] [0.090] [0.077]
(c) Polynom.degree 3 (cubic model):
Discontinuity in Evasion Rate 0.061? 0.060?? 0.052? 0.058?? 0.051??? 0.056???
(δe) [0.031] [0.028] [0.027] [0.024] [0.019] [0.016]
Discontinuity in log(Fees) 0.180??? 0.185??? 0.168??? 0.181??? 0.181??? 0.184???
(δf ) [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.007]
Wald Estimator 0.337? 0.324?? 0.311? 0.317?? 0.282??? 0.305???
(βRD = δe/δf ) [0.176] [0.150] [0.164] [0.133] [0.108] [0.089]
Notes: The table reports estimated discontinuities in license fees and evasion rates together with the corresponding Wald
estimators for linear, quadratic and cubic trends in distance. Within each column, the bold Wald estimators indicate the
model specification which performs best in terms of AIC (see fn. 1). The estimates include all municipalities within a 45,
60 and 90 minutes driving distance to the closest state border in the main sample. The full set of control variables are
included in columns (2), (4) and (6). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ???,??,?indicates significance
at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level, respectively.
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Table III.4: RDD Estimates – Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Width around border: ± 45 min ± 60 min ± 90 min
Control variables: No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations: 1,409 1,409 1,839 1,838 2,277 2,275
(a) Polynom.degree 1 (linear model):
Discontinuity in Evasion Rate 0.041??? 0.036??? 0.040??? 0.036??? 0.027??? 0.026???
(δe) [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Discontinuity in log(Fees) 0.098??? 0.105??? 0.114??? 0.116??? 0.132??? 0.125???
(δf ) [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
Wald Estimator 0.415??? 0.346??? 0.348??? 0.312??? 0.202??? 0.210???
(βRD = δe/δf ) [0.100] [0.092] [0.073] [0.070] [0.052] [0.053]
(b) Polynom.degree 2 (quadratic model):
Discontinuity in Evasion Rate 0.073??? 0.065??? 0.055??? 0.048??? 0.050??? 0.039???
(δe) [0.017] [0.016] [0.013] [0.013] [0.011] [0.011]
Discontinuity in log(Fees) 0.107??? 0.122??? 0.089??? 0.102??? 0.095??? 0.102???
(δf ) [0.011] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.006]
Wald Estimator 0.683??? 0.535??? 0.622??? 0.469??? 0.532??? 0.382???
(βRD = δe/δf ) [0.171] [0.135] [0.164] [0.130] [0.122] [0.106]
(c) Polynom.degree 3 (cubic model):
Discontinuity in Evasion Rate 0.092??? 0.089??? 0.084??? 0.075??? 0.073??? 0.061???
(δe) [0.026] [0.026] [0.021] [0.020] [0.016] [0.015]
Discontinuity in log(Fees) 0.128??? 0.130??? 0.116??? 0.128??? 0.090??? 0.101???
(δf ) [0.016] [0.012] [0.014] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009]
Wald Estimator 0.722??? 0.686??? 0.729??? 0.581??? 0.808??? 0.603???
(βRD = δe/δf ) [0.223] [0.208] [0.200] [0.165] [0.202] [0.158]
Notes: The table reports estimated discontinuities in license fees and evasion rates together with the corresponding Wald
estimators for linear, quadratic and cubic trends in distance. Within each column, the bold Wald estimators indicate
the model specification which performs best in terms of AIC (see fn. 1). The estimates include all municipalities within
a 45, 60 and 90 minutes driving distance to the closest state border in the full sample. The full set of control variables
are included in columns (2), (4) and (6). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ???indicates significance
at the 1%-level.
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Table III.5: Local Linear Regressions based on Euclidian Distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Sample Full Sample
Discontinuity in Evasion Rate 0.039?? 0.044?? 0.055??? 0.067???
[0.017] [0.019] [0.013] [0.017]
Discontinuity in log(Fees) 0.158??? 0.165??? 0.115??? 0.115???
[0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
Wald Estimator 0.244?? 0.265?? 0.477??? 0.587???
[0.108] [0.120] [0.121] [0.160]
Bandwidth (spatial distance) 27.98 km 19.40 km 17.93 km 11.97 km
Observations 959 959 2,140 2,140
Notes: Estimates from local linear regressions based on the minimum Euclidian distance (rather
than driving time) to the closest border. Columns (1) and (2) consider the main border sample,
columns (3) and (4) the full sample. In columns (1) and (3), the bandwidth choice follows Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2012). Columns (2) and (4) set the bandwidth according to Calonico et al.
(2014). Standard errors in parenthesis. ???and ?? indicates significance at the 1% and 5%-level,
respectively.
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